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INTRODUCTION: CRISIS, INTRUSION, AND THE CONSTITUTION

In the time of the COVID-19 pandemic, the world experienced a dramatic global disaster
that did not respect ideologies or borders. Hospitals overflowed with patients in democracies and
dictatorships around the world. In San Francisco, the mayor closed all non-essential businesses.
In India, bodies were burned in mass burials. In Brazil, the Federal Supreme Court endorsed
compulsory vaccination. 1
Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, millions of people died, businesses went bankrupt,
and the whole world changed the way it lived. 2 Cities locked down. 3 Borders closed. 4 Children

Like virtually all compulsory policies, this policy is specified as a condition for utilization of various facilities,
spaces, or activities. Court Decides That Compulsory Vaccination Against COVID-19 Is Constitutional, FED. SUP.
TRIB. (Dec. 17, 2020), https://portal.stf.jus.br/noticias/verNoticiaDetalhe.asp?idConteudo=457462&ori=1.
1

Lee Clifford & Phil Wahba, A running list of companies that have filed for bankruptcy during the coronavirus
pandemic, FORTUNE (Oct. 8, 2020), https://fortune.com/2020/08/04/companies-filing-bankruptcy-2020-due-tocovid-list-filed-chapter-11-coronavirus-pandemic.
2

Chico Harlan & Stefano Pitrelli, Italy extends coronavirus lockdown to entire country, imposing restrictions on 60
million people, WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/italy-extendscoronavirus-lockdown-to-entire-country-imposing-restrictions-on-60-million-people/2020/03/09/baa10058-624811ea-8a8e-5c5336b32760_story.html; New York City to Close Schools, Restaurants and Bars, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/15/nyregion/new-york-coronavirus.html; Cal. Exec. Order No. 33-20
(Mar. 4, 2020).
3

Fact Sheet: DHS Measures on the Border to Limit the Further Spread of Coronavirus, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND
SEC. (Oct. 19, 2020), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2020/10/19/fact-sheet-dhs-measures-border-limit-further-spreadcoronavirus; The Department of State has issued COVID-19 Traveler Information and advises all U.S. citizens to
read the country-specific Travel Advisories and U.S. Embassy COVID pages for updates on the impact of COVID19 worldwide, U.S. EMBASSY & CONSULATES IN FR. (Jan. 19, 2021), https://fr.usembassy.gov/covid-19information/.
4
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could not visit their dying parents. 5 Zoom became a verb. 6 Business travel changed. 7 Sports
teams were excluded from national championships. 8 Some aspects of life will go back to “normal,”
and some will be permanently changed.
Governments need to do better in the next pandemic. Government responses to
emergencies generally have been chaotic, 9 and the COVID crisis was no exception. Scholars have
observed that governments are awkward in responding to crisis. This conclusion is unsurprising.
Crises require governments to make difficult decisions under time pressures, public outcries, and
constitutional limits.
One of the clear revelations that came out of this crisis was the vast new scope of intrusion
into citizens’ personal lives. Intrusions are a part of a government’s response to most
emergencies. 10 Whether it is a global pandemic or a forest fire, governments are empowered to
make decisions to protect the safety and welfare of their citizens, and that often results in intruding
on someone’s rights. In response to the pandemic, governmental intrusions on individual liberties
increased. 11 Those intrusions in this pandemic were different to those in typical emergencies. In
a global pandemic, governments’ use of their vast capacity to observe and gather information
through the internet, surveillance, and new technology was justified. 12
While many intrusions have been justified to save lives and to prevent the continued spread
of COVID-19, 13 we should focus on the long-term impacts of emergency policies. This article
Katie Hafner, ‘A Heart-Wrenching Thing’: Hospital Bans on Visits Devastate Families, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/29/health/coronavirus-hospital-visit-ban.html.

5

Jeffrey Barg, How coronavirus made ‘zoom’ a verb and other ways the pandemic has changed our language,
PHILA. INQUIRER (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.inquirer.com/opinion/coronavirus-covid-zoom-pandemic-wordslinguistic-20200429.html.
6

Airline mask requirements: Check the policies for 11 US carriers, USA TODAY (Sept. 8, 2020),
https://www.usatoday.com/picture-gallery/travel/airline-news/2020/05/05/coronavirus-these-airlines-requirepassengers-wear-face-masks/3085794001/.
7

The NCAA excluded North Carolina State University in the middle of the college world series. The NCAA
required unvaccinated players and coaches to undergo testing every other day at championship sites. Testing and
contact tracing decided that the team could not continue playing one game away from the finals. Steve Wiseman,
Positive COVID-19 tests knocked NC State baseball out of the CWS. What about Vanderbilt?, NEWS & OBSERVER
(June 27, 2021), https://www.newsobserver.com/sports/college/acc/nc-state/article252391598.html.
8

Hurricane Katrina was one of the most appalling governmental failures in recent history. The U.S. government has
a tendency to shy away from disaster preparation in the name of flexibility, but “[w]hile information typically
becomes more plentiful over time, other inputs to legal decisions, particularly decisional resources, often become
scarcer.” David Super, Against Flexibility, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1375, 1380 (2011).

9

In the wake of in the wake of 9/11, the United States Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act, which authorized
the U.S. government to spy on individuals without identifying to any court either the targeted individual or the
communication devices to be tapped. USA PATRIOT Act, H.R. 3162, 107th Cong. (1st Sess. 2001).
10

11

Infra section IV.

Rahul De et al., Impact on digital surge during Covid-19 pandemic: A viewpoint on research and practice, 55
INT’L J. INFO. MGMT. 102171 (Dec. 2020).
12

Tatsiana Ziniakova, Privacy, Mass Electronic Surveillance, and the Rule of Law in Times of COVID-19, WORLD
JUST.
PROJECT
9
(2020),
13
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will examine the possible policy changes for the next pandemic that will protect constitutional
rights while also protecting people from another lethal pandemic. This article will also propose a
framework for more efficient and forward-thinking emergency responses, which will help protect
individual rights. The response to the global pandemic could be viewed as the most widespread
and comprehensive limitation on individuals in modern history. The world’s population
experienced lockdowns, mandatory closings, curfews, mask mandates, travel limitations,
workplace restrictions, vaccination passports, and gathering of personal data on a grand scale.14
What are the long-term implications, particularly for democratic societies?
As with other historical emergencies and threats to health and security, legal issues take a
backseat to rapid responses to protect health and safety. For example, after the September 11
terrorist attacks, there was little public concern about electronic intrusion, but there was enormous
concern about catching terrorists. 15 The federal government grounded all commercial flights in
the United States for seven days, arguing it had a compelling state interest to prevent other planes
from being used as weapons as justification. 16 The Government also implemented intrusive
surveillance strategies to oversee and monitor private communications of foreign and domestic
individuals in the United States, costing all Americans some of their privacy. 17
The COVID-19 pandemic presents a unique set of legal issues because it occurs in a world
that is interconnected and technologically intertwined. Much like the commerce and
https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/Surveillance%20COVID_v4.pdf (“According to media
reports, drone surveillance has been deployed in the United States, Mexico, Malaysia, Spain, Italy and the UK.”).
Some states shut down nonessential businesses. See, e.g., Erin Schumaker, Here are the states that have shut
down nonessential businesses, ABC NEWS (Apr. 3, 2020, 7:58 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/states-shutessential-businesses-map/story?id=69770806; Alix Martichoux, Gov. Newsom Orders Curfew for Most California
Counties, ABC NEWS 7 (Nov. 20, 2020), https://abc7.com/governor-newsom-california-curfew-gavin-losangeles/8101518/. The mayor of Pueblo, Colorado issued a curfew for the city to decrease mobility among those
ages 20 to 50, who carry the highest infection rate in the state. See Kwame Opam & Concepcion de Leon, Why Are
States Imposing Virus Curfews?, N.Y. Times (Nov. 21, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/21/us/coronavirus-curfew.html; Travel Recommendations by Destination, CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Apr. 25, 2022), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/travelers/mapand-travel-notices.html; Multiple countries made the COVID-19 vaccine mandatory. See, e.g., Factbox: Countries
Making COVID-19 Vaccines Mandatory, REUTERS (Aug. 16, 2021, 11:36 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/world/countries-make-covid-19-vaccines-mandatory-2021-07-13/; COVID-19 Travel
Restrictions by Destination, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (last updated Apr. 11, 2022),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/travelers/map-and-travel-notices.html. Some countries implemented a
vaccine passport system. See, e.g., What is a Green Pass?, MINISTRY OF HEALTH,
https://corona.health.gov.il/en/directives/green-pass-info/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2022). Data shows that hacking was
more frequent during the pandemic. See Maggie Miller, FBI Sees Spike in Cyber Crime Reports During
Coronavirus Pandemic, HILL (Apr. 16, 2020, 3:27 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/493198-fbi-seesspike-in-cyber-crime-reports-during-coronavirus-pandemic.
14

For instance, the Terrorist Surveillance Program created during the Bush Administration authorized electronic
surveillance without judicial approval as an effort to catch terrorists. See Tracey Maclin, The Bush Administration’s
Terrorist Surveillance Program and the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Requirement: Lessons from Justice Powell
and the Keith Case, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1259, 1293 (2008).
15

16
All flights stopped nationwide, CNN (Sept. 11, 2001),
https://www.cnn.com/2001/TRAVEL/NEWS/09/11/faa.airports/.
17

See Maclin, supra note 15, at 1294.
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communication in today’s world, COVID-19 is not limited by national boundaries. Pandemicbased privacy intrusions include limitations on personal freedoms like the right to travel and the
gathering of personal information through contact tracing. Different technologies have been used
to gather large amounts of personal health data, pushing the constitutional limits of government
action. Government and public health officials justified these intrusions and argued their
constitutionality by showing how information on hospitalization, infection, and mortality rates
helps them implement the best defenses against COVID-19 and its spread. 18 However, even with
these compelling justifications, the COVID-9 pandemic brings in to focus the most critical issues
of personal privacy, and it does so in a way that magnifies the realities of the modern world.
United States courts have already begun to weigh in on the constitutional limits implicated in
this pandemic. By the end of COVID-19, the United States will have a new jurisprudence that, at
least preliminarily, defines the boundaries of governmental authority, tests the utility of federalism
in nationwide crises, and defines a series of individual rights, including personal autonomy, data
privacy, freedom of movement, freedom of religion, and personal property rights. Section IV of
this article will discuss the initial cases on those issues.
Notably, there is a lack of universal agreement among government and health officials
regarding the effectiveness of policies put in place to stop the spread of COVID-19. To balance
the advantages and disadvantages of such measures, one must determine how dangerous a threat
must be to justify restrictions on people’s fundamental rights, including the right to privacy. There
must also be a determination of the duration of the restrictions being enforced. In the context of
the COVID-19 pandemic, it must be determined must be made whether a virus provides enough
legal justification to allow governments restrictions on privacy and justification for the severity of
the restrictions. After all, part of the legal test to restrict a fundamental right is to restrict that right
by the least intrusive means. 19
The final determinations will vary greatly depending on the governmental regime and national
culture. Governments have a duty to make decisions for the common good of their citizens, 20 but
government action is not the only indicator of how a country will be affected during a pandemic.
Culture is a central element to privacy invasions in the pandemic. 21 Some cultures have already
experienced lost freedoms and reduced privacy before COVID-19. 22 The pandemic can justify
18
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention states that “[c]ontact tracing is a key component of controlling
transmission of infectious diseases.” Operational Considerations for Adapting a Contact Tracing Program to Respond
to the COVID-19 Pandemic in Non-US Settings, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Dec. 9, 2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/global-covid-19/operational-considerations-contact-tracing.html.
19

Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).

The common good is an important concept of political philosophy discussed in the literature by many philosophers
such as Plato, Aristotle, John Locke, J.J. Rousseau, Adam Smith, G.W.F. Hegel, John Rawls and Michael Walzer. See
(Feb.
26,
2018),
Hussain
Waheed,
The
Common
Good,
STANF. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/common-good/.
20

See infra Section III (discussing the relationship and effects that culture has on the law, specifically in the context
of intrusions to privacy).

21

China is certainly the greatest example of mass surveillance by the government. See Charlie Campbell, ‘The
Entire System Is Designed to Suppress Us.' What the Chinese Surveillance State Means for the Rest of the World,
TIME (Nov. 21, 2019), https://time.com/5735411/china-surveillance-privacy-issues/.

22
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governments to further their surveillance state under the guise of protecting public health. 23 Some
citizens in certain cultures have accepted government or health care guidance, and citizens have
voluntarily restricted their personal lives and activities. 24 Others obey the governmental mandates
to wear masks, avoid crowds, and social distance with no pushback. 25 Conversely, there are
cultures that seem inherently to distrust the government and revere individual freedom are more
resistant to government regulation. 26
Although governments and cultures reacted in various ways, the pandemic honored no borders
and created a global health crisis. Unlike localized disasters, wars, or terrorist attacks, virtually
every individual in the world was vulnerable. This article seeks to evaluate the responses to this
global crisis through the lens of individual freedoms. Unquestionably this crisis fostered multiple
governmental reactions to the pandemic which we will describe. Fundamental to these reactions
are the laws specifically designed to deal with emergencies, which this article will first identify.
II.

CRISIS AND THE LAW OF EMERGENCIES

Extraordinary times require extraordinary measures. In fact, most countries have policies for
emergencies that facilitate swift action. 27 Because emergencies, by definition, require rapid action,

In the wake of COVID-19, many apps that aimed to control the spread of COVID-19 were created. As reported by
Privacy International, “[t]he self-testing web app issued by Argentina's Secretariat of Public Innovation, asked for
national ID number, email[,] and phone as mandatory fields in order to submit the test, while the Android version
required numerous permissions, including contacts, geolocation data (both network-based and GPS), and access to the
microphone and camera.” There's an app for that: Coronavirus apps, PRIVACY INT’L (Apr. 20, 2020),
https://privacyinternational.org/long-read/3675/theres-app-coronavirus-apps.
23

See Sheng-Fang Su & Yueh-Ying Han, How Taiwan, a non-WHO member, takes actions in response to COVID19, 10 J. GLOB. HEALTH 010380 (June 2020); Paul de Vries, COVID-19 versus Japan’s culture of collectivism,
JAPAN TIMES (May 22, 2020), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2020/05/22/commentary/japancommentary/covid-19-versus-japans-culture-collectivism/.
24

25
See generally Dighe et al, Response to COVID-19 in South Korea and implications for lifting stringent
interventions, 18 BMC MED. 1 (Oct. 9, 2020), https://bmcmedicine.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12916020-01791-8 (discussing South Korea’s rapid control of local transmission with its “test, trace, isolate” strategy);
Daniel J. Samet, Israel exemplifies how to respond to the coronavirus, ATLANTIC COUNCIL (Mar. 12, 2020),
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/israel-exemplifies-how-to-respond-to-the-coronavirus/ (noting
how the Israeli response model is not feasible for other states, like the United States).
26
For example, Brazilians demonstrated that they do not believe health crises justify intrusions upon the privacy of
their homes and bodies. See Pedro Cantisano, What a 1904 Vaccine Effort Can Teach Brazil Today, U.S. NEWS (Dec.
7, 2020), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2020-12-07/brazils-leader-ignores-deadly-viruslessons-from-the-past. In 1904, the Brazilian National Congress passed a law establishing mandatory vaccination,
aiming to combat the smallpox outbreak in the country. Id. Health authorities and police officers were authorized to
enter homes and forcibly vaccinate members of the home. Id. The people responded with violence. Id. Because the
people were not culturally accustomed to such intrusions, the response was so severe that the Government had to
suspend the law and stop mandatory vaccinations. Id.
27
See, e.g., COVID-19 Civic Freedom Tracker: Keep Civic Space Healthy, INT’L CTR. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. (Feb. 11,
2021), https://www.icnl.org/covid19tracker/?issue=5 (monitoring government emergency responses to COVID
around the world that affect civic freedoms and human rights).
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emergency actions are most often ordered by the Executive branch. 28 Legislatures are not
inherently rapid response entities, and courts are more deliberative and reactive by design. Thus,
the balance of power in emergencies is given to or taken by the executive branches of
government. 29 By design, presidents, governors, and mayors are the focal point of emergency
powers. 30 David Super, a public welfare law professor at Georgetown University Law Center,
suggests that multi-tiered governments are ill suited to emergencies because of jurisdictional
uncertainty. 31 Super identifies the Hurricane Katrina disaster as emblematic of confusion and the
failure of the federal government to exercise powers and capabilities. 32 Clarifying federal
responsibility for large scale responses makes sense. In the case of COVID-19, the federal
government should take responsibility for large-scale multi state issues such as defining the threat
level of the pandemic, funding large-scale responses to unemployment or physical damage, and
verifying and testing vaccines and treatments. National uniformity makes sense for issues like
international and interstate travel policies. However, even in a global pandemic some issues are
more local and benefit from state and local government policies. 33 Cities may have different levels
of infection that require different responses. Because of the vast geographical areas countries like
Brazil and the United States can benefit from a federal system that provides for varied responses
at different levels of government. The challenge is to define the boundaries of federal, state, and
local authority.
The United States and Brazil are two countries that increase the power of the executive branch
during emergencies. 34 Laws during emergencies may be certain regarding the enlargement of the
executive power, but there is still great ambiguity and uncertainty regarding the exact definition
of emergency and the extent of emergency powers.
This article will propose a legal framework for pandemic response that clarifies the
constitutional authority possessed by each level of government during health emergencies. 35 The
framework utilizes science to determine the extent of emergency, and it uses the resulting
determination of extent to evaluate whether a compelling state interest exists. 36
Ultimately this article suggests an approach to the next pandemic. An “approach” is
more than a plan. The Centers for Disease Control(CDC) and the World Health Organization

E.g., National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601–51 (1976); Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. 247(d)
(1944); Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121 et seq. (1988).

28

29

Infra Section II (these aspects will be discussed further throughout the article).

30

Id.

31

Super, supra note 9, at 1380.

32

Id.

M. Jae Moon, Fighting COVID-19 with Agility, Transparency, and Participation: Wicked Policy Problems and
New Governance Challenges, 80 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 651, 652, 655 (2020).
33

34

Infra Section II.

35

Infra Section V.

36

Infra Section V(b).
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(WHO) have plans for pandemics. 37 Plans include rational threat assessments and responses, but
they do not include guidance for how and when public officials at all levels of government
implement emergency provisions. Guidance is possible but officials will make decisions based
on their judgment, authority, legal limitations, and public support.
With a pervasive pandemic, it turns out that a federal system with strong local
governments may be the best model if every level plays a role. There is a role for the courts as
well – to provide the guardrails for actions of public and private entities that intrude or abuse
individual rights. The courts will have to make the assessment of whether the government action
is justified by the compelling interest of a pandemic and whether private action is legal, like
whether an employer can require employees to be vaccinated.
Some lessons from COVID are clear. National governments must perform several
functions: conduct research on the pandemic, fund research for vaccines and treatments, verify
vaccines and treatments, provide a threat assessment and, perhaps most importantly, provide
leadership with a cohesive, trustworthy message for individuals and other levels of government.
The federal government should designate the level of the pandemic (on a scale of 1-10) and work
with all levels of government to define actions and responses to the pandemic. These are
complex tasks.
This article describes a wide array of responses to a pandemic. The list includes testing,
tracking, tracing, quarantining, mask restrictions, travel restrictions, business closings,
occupancy restrictions, curfews, and vaccination requirements. These various actions have been
taken by the federal government, state governments, and local governments and, in some cases,
private entities. For example, cruise lines implemented vaccination and testing requirements. 38
Sorting out an “approach” for the pandemic starts with identifying the pandemic and
defining its severity. The medical standards are established that designate lethality and
transmissibility.39 For example, Ebola is deadly and highly contagious and common flu is
contagious but not as deadly. There is also the daunting task of determining of how, where, and
when to implement the wide array of intrusive requirements, mandates, or programs. How and
when to implement them, at what level of government, and for how long are central questions.
Different actions, different times, different facts, and different circumstances may justify actions
or not. The national maps show how different the number of cases and rate of infection are in
different locations at different times.

National Pandemic Strategy, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (2017),
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/national-strategy/index.html; WHO Global Influenza Preparedness
Plan, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (2005),
https://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/influenza/WHO_CDS_CSR_GIP_2005_5.pdf.
37

Alison Fox, Every Cruise Line requiring Passengers to be Vaccinated Before Boarding, TRAVEL + LEISURE (Feb.
9, 2022), https://www.travelandleisure.com/cruises/cruises-that-allow-vaccinated-travelers.
38

Pandemic Severity Assessment Framework, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (2016),
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/national-strategy/severity-assessment-framework.html.
39
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This array of possible actions is affected by legal and constitutional restraints. A wide
array of lawsuits challenging various actions are pending. 40 There are boundaries and limits to
emergency authority being exercised by federal state and local governments. There are
constitutional boundaries related to free speech, freedom of religion, freedom of movement, due
process, and right to travel. Even during a pandemic, the Constitution will apply. 41 But facts
and circumstances matter. A deadly and contagious virus provides a compelling government
interest to justify emergency action.
Countries have enlisted numerous restrictive measures to combat the spread of COVID-19.
These measures include: issuing quarantine mandates, curfew times, and stay at home orders;
limiting access to businesses; enacting mandatory business closures; mandating vaccines and face
masks; requiring a vaccine passport; issuing travel limitations; and requiring mandatory COVID19 testing.
In the United States, state, and local governments imposed penalties for violating quarantine
orders. 42
California, for instance, considered violating a quarantine order to be a
misdemeanor offense punishable by up to ninety days in county jail. 43 New York City has
required vaccine passports or proof of COVID-19 vaccination for most indoor activities. 44 New
York State uses an app called Excelsior Pass to determine an individual’s vaccination status.
Excelsior Pass uses personal information to check against state vaccination records, and a variation
of the vaccine pass the app offers, called the ‘Pass Plus,’” may allow businesses “to save or store
the information contained.” 45
Similarly, Europe uses the European Union (EU) Digital COVID Certificate as a “vaccine
passport.” 46 The certificate is not a precondition to free movement, but without it, individuals
Lawsuits About State Actions and Policies in Response to the Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Lawsuits_about_state_actions_and_policies_in_response_to_the_coronavirus_(COVID19)_pandemic,_2020-2021 (last visited May 7, 2022).
40

“Even if the Constitution has taken a holiday during this pandemic, it cannot become a sabbatical.” Roman
Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 69–70 (Nov. 25, 2020).
41

Many states issued quarantine orders during the COVID-19 pandemic; some states imposed penalties for violating
these orders, and others did not. See, e.g., State of Alaska COVID-19 Mandate 010, STATE OF ALASKA COVID-19
(CORONAVIRUS) INFO. (last updated Oct. 15, 2020), https://covid19.alaska.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2020/10/10152020-COVID-MANDATE-010-REVISED.pdf; Fla. Exec. Order No. 20-80 (Mar. 23,
2020); State of California Travel Advisory, CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH (Dec. 13, 2021),
https://www.cdph.ca.gov/programs/CID/DCDC/pages/COVID-19/Travel-Advisory.aspx. Many local governments
within the United States also initiated quarantine orders. See, e.g., County of Contra Costa Updated Mass Quarantine
Order, No. HO-COVID19-50 (July 23, 2021), https://813dcad3-2b07-4f3f-a25e23c48c566922.filesusr.com/ugd/84606e_44a06b0178814954b916802e2e01e753.pdf.
42

43

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120275 (2020).

New York implemented a vaccine passport system. Sharon Otterman, Will the Excelsior Pass, New York’s
Vaccine Passport, Catch On?, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/01/nyregion/excelsiorpass-vaccine.html.
44

Excelsior Pass Plus: Frequently Asked Questions, N.Y. STATE, https://covid19vaccine.health.ny.gov/excelsiorpass-plus-frequently-asked-questions (last visited Apr. 11, 2022).

45

EU Digital COVID Certificate, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-eu/coronavirusresponse/safe-covid-19-vaccines-europeans/eu-digital-covid-certificate_en (last visited Apr. 11, 2022).
46
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might be subject to restrictive measures like mandatory COVID testing or quarantining. Almost
every nation in the world has adopted some sort of travel restrictions. 47 The countries that have
not determined mandatory quarantine upon arrival still require a negative COVID-19 test. 48 This
article will propose specific policies for defining a pandemic’s severity, defining proper actions
governments can take based on the severity, defining the limits of government action, and creating
a committee to review and classify pandemics as they emerge. This chart below shows how
national, state, and local U.S. governments, the Brazilian government, and other international
governments are addressing the pandemic. It demonstrates lack of uniformity in combatting global
pandemics and direct conflicts. For example, some entities ordered masking and some
governments enacted policies to prohibit mask mandates.
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Travel during the coronavirus pandemic, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-traveleu/coronavirus-response/travel-during-coronavirus-pandemic_en (last visited Apr. 11, 2022); COVID-19 Testing
Required for U.S. Entry, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (last updated Dec. 30, 2021),
https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/international-travel/before-you-go/covid19_testing_required_US_Entry.html.
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A. UNITED STATES
1. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
The Constitution of the United States does not expressly provide for emergency powers, but
several statutes expand federal powers during emergencies. 49
The National Emergencies Act provides that Congress is authorized to grant the president any
special or extraordinary power during national emergencies. 50 This policy grants authority to
Congress to confer authority on the president and therefore accords significant latitude for defining
emergencies. 51 Congress in fact recognized COVID as a national emergency.
In addition, the Stafford Act confers authority on the president and provides a broad definition
of emergency. The Act defines emergency as:
[A]ny occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President, Federal
assistance is needed to supplement State and local efforts and capabilities to save
lives and to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the
threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States. 52
Thus, pursuant to the Act, the president has the authority to define the existence of an
emergency and discretion to determine the nature of assistance. 53 The language of the Stafford
Act provides no distinct boundaries for emergency power. The statute provides that the president
is authorized to establish a program of disaster preparedness that utilizes services of “all
appropriate agencies.” 54 The term “appropriate” is discretionary and allows the President, as the
leader of the Executive branch, to exercise control over any agency he or she deems
“appropriate.” 55
See, e.g., the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et. seq. (2020); the Public Health Service Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 319 et. seq. (2020).
49

50

50 U.S.C. §1621 (2020).

51

This definition allows Congress some flexibility in responding to novel circumstances.

52

42 U.S.C. § 5122(1) (2020).

53

Id.

54

42 U.S.C. § 5131 (2020).

55

U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl.1.

58
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The Stafford Act also provides that the president may coordinate federal programs of disaster
preparedness and programs run by State and local authorities. 56 Depending on the philosophy of
the president, this “coordination” could result in highly centralized authority; that has not been the
case during the current pandemic. In fact, it is governors and mayors who enacted the most severe
measures, as the national government receives criticism for failing to provide enough guidance or
leadership. 57 Nonetheless, the statutory structure could justify more intrusive actions by the
federal government in a future crisis.
Finally, the Stafford Act expressly provides that the president has the authority to apply science
and technology to address the emergency. 58 That statement seems rational, especially when
dealing with a crisis that needs scientific answers. However, the use of modern technology
presents real risks of abuse. Some technologies that may be useful in a health crisis also carry a
risk of abuse in a surveillance state. For example, CCTV coverage with thermal imaging can
detect individuals with elevated temperatures, drones can identify where crowds gather in violation
of social distancing standards, and internet surveillance can identify geographical concentrations
of the disease. 59 Each of these uses can be a tool in a health crisis but also can provide a basis for
intrusions on personal privacy.
In addition to emergency powers, the Stafford Act provides additional powers to address a
“major disaster.” 60 Major disaster means any natural catastrophe which causes damage of
sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance. 61 Unlike emergency
powers, the extent of the major disaster powers is more limited. 62 In a major disaster, the president
is authorized to supplement efforts and available resources of states, local governments, and
disaster relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused therein. 63
While emergency powers may affect the relationship of power between state and federal
governments, the “major disaster” powers focus on providing federal support to the states, local
authorities, and organizations. 64

56

§ 5131(5).

Phillip A. Wallach & Justus Myers, The Federal Government’s Coronavirus Response—Public Health Timeline,
BROOKINGS INST. (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-federal-governments-coronavirusactions-and-failures-timeline-and-themes/.
57

58

§ 5131(a)(6).

Thermal Imaging Systems (Infrared Thermographic Systems / Thermal Imaging Cameras), U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (Jan. 12, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/general-hospital-devices-and-supplies/thermalimaging-systems-infrared-thermographic-systems-thermal-imaging-cameras; Jed Pressgrove, Drones Become Part
of Local U.S. Responses to COVID-19, GOV’T TECH. (Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.govtech.com/products/DronesBecome-Part-of-Local-US-Responses-to-COVID-19.html; Apps and COVID-19, PRIVACY INT’L,
https://privacyinternational.org/examples/apps-and-covid-19 (last visited Apr. 11, 2022).
59

60

42 U.S.C. §§ 5121 et. seq. (2020).

61

§ 5122(2).

62

Id.

63

§ 5121(b).

64

§ 5196.
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Another source of statutory authority is the Public Health Service Act, which grants
extraordinary powers to combat health emergencies. 65 The statute authorizes the Secretary of
Health and Human Services (“Secretary”) to lead the federal public health and medical responses
related to public health emergencies. 66 The Secretary is authorized to declare a public health
emergency when a disease or disorder presents danger to the public health or when there are
outbreaks of infectious diseases or bioterrorist attacks. 67 Additionally, the statute provides a wide
range of measures the Surgeon General can take upon the Secretary’s approval to prevent the
introduction and spread of communicable diseases. 68 For example, the Surgeon General can order
inspection, fumigation, disinfection, sanitation, pest extermination, destruction of animals and
articles, suspension of entries and imports, creation of quarantine stations, and other measures, as
he or she deems necessary. 69
As a result of the confirmed cases of COVID-19, the Secretary declared a public health
emergency exists. 70 Subsequently, the President designated COVID-19 as a national emergency
due to the number of infections in the United States reaching a sufficient threshold to threaten the
nation’s healthcare system, thus satisfying the circumstances necessary to declare a national
emergency under the National Emergencies Act. 71 Moreover, he determined that the severity and
magnitude of the impacts of COVID-19 supported the declaration of a major disaster under the
Stafford Act. 72
President Trump took a number of measures during the COVID-19 pandemic, utilizing the
emergency and major disaster powers. Under the Social Security Act and the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), the President authorized the Secretary to waive or
modify certain requirements of Medicare, Medicaid, and Children’s Health Insurance programs. 73
Under the Stafford Act, the President encouraged states and local governments to activate their
Emergency Operations Centers, to review emergency preparedness plans, and to request federal
assistance. 74 The President utilized the Defense Production Act of 1950 to prioritize the allocation

65

42 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (2020).

66

§ 300hh (2020).

67

§§ 300hh–300hh-33 (2020).

68

§§ 264–272.

69

§§ 264–265, 267.

Determination that a Public Health Emergency Exists, OFF. OF ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PREPAREDNESS &
RESPONSE (last updated Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.phe.gov/emergency/news/healthactions/phe/Pages/2019nCoV.aspx.
70

Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID–19) Outbreak, 85 Fed.
Reg. 15337, 15337 (Mar. 18, 2020); 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1651 (2020).

71

Letter from Donald J. Trump, U.S. President, to Federal Agencies, on an Emergency Determination for the
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID–19) Pandemic Under the Stafford Act, Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. (Mar. 13, 2020),
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/LetterFromThePresident.pdf.
72

73

42 U.S.C. § 1135b-5 (2020).

74

42 U.S.C. § 5131 (2020).

60

LEGISLATION & POLICY BRIEF

of health and medical materials, services, and facilities deemed “necessary or appropriate to
promote national defense.” 75
During the pandemic, an exception to the standard protection on personal health information
was used in order to promote public health objectives. 76 Under HIPAA’s Privacy Rule, 77 a
covered entity 78 may disclose personal health information without the individual’s authorization
(1) to a public health authority for the purpose of preventing or controlling disease 79 and (2) to a
person who may have been exposed to a communicable disease or may otherwise be at risk of
contracting or spreading. 80 Under the COVID-19 public health emergency, hospitals and clinics,
for example, may disclose a broad range of medical information, including identifying
information, of individuals who have been infected with, or exposed to, the virus to first responders
and public health authorities without individuals’ authorization for public health purposes. 81
As a matter of policy, we believe there should be limitations on the exercise of emergency and
disaster relief. By definition, the powers granted are extraordinary and authorized for a specific
purpose. Therefore, any emergency policy should be measured by the following three standards:
(1)
(2)
(3)

The measures taken should be taken within the defined and designated powers of
the statutes or ordinances.
The measure should be limited in scope and accomplish purposes of the policy and
not unnecessarily infringe on personal rights.
The measure should be limited in duration but renewable while the emergency
exists.

In the early stages of the pandemic in 2019 and 2020, the actions of the federal government
were defined, limited, and followed these basic guidelines. Emergency actions were authorized,
and there was an increase in health care support and federal monetary assistance. Other subsequent
federal actions that were legally contested include vaccine mandates that are specifically discussed
in Section IV.
2. STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Emergency powers are granted to states and local authorities, and those powers are defined
very broadly. 82 The issue of local control has come into sharp focus during the pandemic because
75

Exec. Order No. 13,909, 56 Fed. Reg. 16,227, 16,227–28 (Mar. 18, 2020).

76

45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b) (2020). 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.102 et seq. (2020).

77

§§ 160.101 et seq., 164.102 et seq.

§ 160.103 (“Covered entity means: (1) A health plan[;] (2) A health care clearinghouse[;] [or] (3) A health care
provider who transmits any health information in electronic form in connection with a transaction . . . .”).
78

79

§ 164.512(b)(1)(i).

80

§ 164.512(b)(1)(iv).

81

COVID-19 and HIPAA: Disclosures to law enforcement, paramedics, other first responders and public health
authorities, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OFF. FOR CIV. RTS.,
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/covid-19-hipaa-and-first-responders-508.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2022).
82

Infra Section § II(a)(2).
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of the differences in approach by various states and local governments. For example, San
Francisco implemented a strict lockdown procedure while other areas such as South Dakota, Utah,
and Oklahoma imposed very few restrictions. 83 There are rational reasons for different approaches
based on the degree of outbreak, density of population, and other factors. The legal basis for these
actions depends upon state laws and local ordinances as well as how the local actions interact with
Federal policies. In state constitutional structures, local governments are given leeway in local
policy making. However, under most state constitutional structures, the state government is
empowered to preempt local governments on state issues. 84
Florida provides an example of a large state with multiple large municipalities and counties
that take varied approaches. Florida defines emergency as “any occurrence, or threat thereof,
whether natural, technological, or manmade, in war or in peace, which results or may result in
substantial injury or harm to the population or substantial damage to or loss of property.” 85 Florida
Governor Ron DeSantis declared that COVID-19 justified a state of emergency. 86 Under the state
of emergency, Governor DeSantis issued several state mandates, and initially some of the state
measures were stricter than federal measures.
Under Chapter 252, Section 36(5)(k) of the Florida statutes, Governor DeSantis issued a “stay
at home” measure, ordering senior citizens and individuals with fragile health to stay at home and
take all measures to limit the risk of exposure. 87 The measure required that all persons in Florida
limit their movements to those necessary to obtain or provide essential services or conduct
essential activities. 88 Additionally, social gatherings were prohibited. 89
Generally, under Chapter 252 of the Florida Statutes, Governor DeSantis ordered vacation
rental businesses to stop activities, including advertisement and scheduling future reservations.90
Governor DeSantis also ordered the suspension of mortgage foreclosures and evictions. 91 Each
measure taken by Governor DeSantis may be considered appropriate under the three-prong test.
The first element of the three-part test requires that measures taken must be within the defined
and designated powers of the statutes. Governor DeSantis’s “stay at home” measure finds
statutory support. According to Florida law:
Ayla Ellison. 10 states with the fewest, most COVID-19 restrictions, BECKER'S HOSP. REV. (Sep. 15, 2021),
https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/rankings-and-ratings/10-state-with-the-fewest-most-covid-19-restrictions091520.html.
83

Federal and State Pre-emption Basics, NAT'L CONF. STATE LEGS. (Jul. 9, 2016), https://www.ncsl.org/legislatorsstaff/legislative-staff/research-editorial-legal-and-committee-staff/webinar-federal-and-state-preemptionbasics.aspx.
84

85

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 252.36 (5)(k) (West 2021).

86

Fla. Exec. Order No. 20-52 (Mar. 9, 2020).

87

Fla. Exec. Order No. 20-83 (Mar. 24, 2020).

88

Id.

89

Id.

90

Fla. Exec. Order No. 20-87, March 27, 2020.

91

Fla. Exec. Order No. 20-94, April 2, 2020.
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In addition to any other powers conferred upon the Governor by law, he or she may
( . . . ) Take measures concerning the conduct of civilians, the movement and
cessation of movement of pedestrian and vehicular traffic prior to, during, and
subsequent to drills and actual or threatened emergencies, the calling of public
meetings and gatherings, and the evacuation and reception of civilian population.92

The statute explicitly grants the governor to power to control the movement of the population
during a state of emergency. 93 Considering that the governor declared a state of emergency in
reaction to COVID-19, the measure appears to be aligned with the law.
The second element requires evaluating whether the measures taken justify the limitations and
intrusions on personal liberties. In other words: Do measures such as quarantining and social
distancing help limit the spread of COVID? In 2019, COVID-19 was new. Medical professionals
and public health specialists were asked how to stop the pandemic, how to reduce individual’s
chances of exposure, and how to make the health system able to address the issues of a pandemic. 94
All of these complex health issues had to be addressed by governmental officials who relied the
continually evolving information from health care officials. 95 In retrospect, some of those
decisions had a positive effect while others were not as successful. But there was rational support
for the decisions. Ultimately, history will judge, but officials and the courts have the harder task
of making decisions in the middle of the crisis.
The third element of the test requires that emergency powers have time limits. A state of
emergency proclaimed by Florida’s governor has a time limit of sixty days, 96 and Governor
DeSantis’s state of emergency in response to COVID-19 was extended eight times, extending to
over 500 days. 97 This element of sound emergency policy requires continual review of the need
to maintain restrictions and controls. Florida did continual reviews and terminated restrictions.
Ultimately, continuation of emergency measures is a policy and health care debate. However,
there is a necessity that the debate occurs and that restrictions are not perpetuated without review.
In response to a crisis like the pandemic, that government is entitled and even obligated to
restrict liberty in the protection of public health. 98 There are, of course, challenges to these
92

FLA. STAT. ANN. 252.36(k) (West 2021).

93

Id.

See CDC’s Response: Preparing first responders, healthcare providers, and health systems, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION (Dec. 31, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cdcresponse/index.html
(Feb. 12, 2021)
94

NPR interviewed three global leaders who shared how their countries are addressing COVID-19. Morning Edition,
The Global Leaders Who Have Been Effective During the Coronavirus, NPR (Apr. 16, 2020),
https://www.npr.org/2020/04/16/835710001/the-world-leaders-who-have-been-effective-during-the-coronavirus.
95

96

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 252.36(2) (West 2021).

97
Fla. Exec. Order 20-114 (May 8, 2020); Fla. Exec. Order 20-166 (July 7, 2020); Fla. Exec. Order 20-192 (Aug. 5,
2020); Fla. Exec. Order 20-213 (Sept. 4, 2020); Fla. Exec. Order 20-276 (Nov. 3, 2020); Fla. Exec. Order 20-316
(Dec. 29, 2020); Fla. Exec. Order 21-45 (Feb. 26, 2021); Fla. Exec. Order 21-94 (Apr. 27, 2021).

Erwin Chemerinsky, Yes, the government can restrict your liberty to protect public health, LOS ANGELES TIMES
(Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2020-04-20/government-can-restrict-your-liberty-to-protectpublic-health-courts-have-made-that-clear; Stephanie Wylie, The Supreme Court Should not Politicize Valid Public
98
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intrusions on liberty. For example, challenges have been raised against local orders for business
closings and mask orders. 99 Those challenges are grounded in privacy and liberty arguments. 100
Florida courts were reluctant to overturn emergency actions in the middle of a pandemic, 101 and
that was true nationwide. 102 Overall, depending on the facts, quarantine and social distancing
mandates are arguably justified within the statutory definitions of emergency powers. The
legitimacy of government mandates depends on the actual circumstances of the pandemic and
whether the measures continue to be justified by the facts.
As the pandemic evolved in 2022, some states, including Florida, changed course. In fact,
Florida state government prohibited local restrictions such as mask requirements. 103 There was
conflict between state and local authorities and the state ultimately prevailed. 104
In the rollercoaster ride of the pandemic, some localities suspended mandates and then
reinstated them. 105 Restrictions have become more controversial as the pandemic continues to
mutate and drag on. The severest of restrictions such as business shutdowns and quarantines test
the patience of citizens, the limits of governmental power, and the resilience of the economy.
When “non-essential” businesses were temporarily shut down, millions of people lost their jobs,
and the American economy took a downward turn. 106 The government took steps to alleviate the
economic hardships caused by the pandemic by suspending foreclosures and evictions and by
issuing stimulus checks. 107
While the federal and state governments enacted emergency policies, local governments took
their own steps. A critical part of the ultimate legal story is the interaction of federal, state, and
Health
Orders,
CTR.
FOR
AM .
PROGRESS
(Sept.
2,
2020),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/courts/reports/2020/09/02/489964/supreme-court-not-politicize-validpublic-health-orders/.
99

Green v. Alachua County, 323 So. 3d 246, 249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021).

100

Chemerinsky, supra note 98.

See generally Machovec v. Palm Beach Cty., 310 So. 3d 941 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021); Power v. Leon County,
No. 37-2020-CA-001200 (Fla. 2d Jud. Cir. Ct. 2020); 4 Aces Enters., LLC v. Edwards, 479 F. Supp. 3d 311 (E.D. La.
2020).
101

102

Chemerinsky, supra note 98.

103

Florida Executive Order 21-175 (2021); Fla. Stat. 112.0441.

Florida First DCA Order upholding Governor DeSantis’s ban on mask mandates in public schools, Case No.
1D21-2685, September 10, 2021.
104

105
Corky Siemaszko, New Lockdowns and restrictions sweep across the country as COVID-19 cases continue to rise,
NBC NEWS (Nov. 16, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/new-lockdowns-restrictions-sweep-acrosscountry-covid-19-cases-continue-n1247919.

Michael Ettlinger & Jordan Hensley, COVID-19 Economic Crisis: By State, UNIV.OF N. H. CARSEY SCH. OF PUB.
POL’Y (Jan. 13, 2021), https://carsey.unh.edu/COVID-19-Economic-Impact-By-State.
106

See Alicia Adamczyk, From Stimulus Checks to Unemployment Insurance, Here’s how 2021 Covid-19 Relief can
Affect your 2022 Finances, CNBC (Jan. 7, 2022, 2:10 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2022/01/07/how-2021-covid-19relief-can-affect-your-2022-finances.html; Temporary Halt in Residential Evictions to Prevent the Further Spread of
COVID-19, 86 Fed. Reg. 34010 (June 28, 2021).
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64

LEGISLATION & POLICY BRIEF

local policies. In many ways, the national government allowed local and state governments to
make decisions for their communities without intervening. 108
Mayor Giménez of Miami Dade County in Florida used local authority to implement COVID19 policies. Under Section 8B 7(2)(f) of the Miami Code, Mayor Giménez ordered the closure of
all non-essential retail and commercial establishments. 109 Without any specific legal authority,
Mayor Giménez ordered the use of facial masks where social distancing was not possible.110
Mayor Giménez also ordered the use of facial masks everywhere under the penalty of arrest and
monetary penalties without a specific provision giving him the authority to make this type of
mandate. 111
The business closure measure is supported in the Miami-Dade County Code of Ordinances.
The statute provides:
Once a Local State of Emergency has been declared, the Manager is authorized by
the Mayor and the Board to order any or all of the following actions: ( . . . ))) An
order requiring any or all commercial establishments located in areas of imminent
or actual danger to close and remain closed until further order. 112
Mayor Giménez is explicitly authorized by the ordinance to order business closure under a state
of emergency. The first prong of our analysis is, therefore, met.
The second issue is whether the severity of the specific measures was justified to address issues
arising from COVID-19. At the time of Mayor Giménez’s closures, there were serious concerns
about their efficacy in reducing the spread and the potential negative impact the closures would
have on local businesses. 113 Studies show that business closure measures were effective in
conjunction with stay at home orders and the prohibition of public gatherings, but the effectiveness
of particular closings is still debated. 114 While the measures may be controversial, they may be
justified for a limited period of time.
Mayor Giménez’s facial mask measure may be appropriate because studies of masks suggest
that they are beneficial to reducing the spread of COVID-19. 115 However, the measures require
more scrutiny when “recommendations” become rules with penalties like civil fines or criminal

108

See discussion infra Section V.

109

MIAMI-DADE, FLA., Emergency Order 07-20 (2020).

110

MIAMI-DADE, FLA., Emergency Order 20-20 (2020).

111

MIAMI-DADE, FLA., Emergency Order 20-16 (2020).

112

MIAMI-DADE, FLA., Municipal Code ch. 8, § 8B-7 (2020).

Alexander W. Bartik, et al, The Impact of COVID-19 on Small Business Outcomes and Expectations¸ 117 ECON.
SCIS. 17656, 17656 (2020).
113

J.M. Braunder et al., Inferring the Effectiveness of Government Interventions Against COVID-19, 802 SCI. 371,
371 (2020); Henning Bundgaard et al., Effectiveness of Adding a Mask Recommendation to Other Public Health
Measures to Prevent SARS-CoV-2 Infection in Danish Wearers, 174 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 335, 335 (2021).
114

115

Talib Dbouk & Dimitris Drikakis, On Respiratory Droplets and Face Masks, 32 PHYSICS FLUIDS 063303 (1994).
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penalties. 116 Strict standards were implemented and justified by showing the need to protect public
health and safety; however, criminal penalties were not widely supported and not enforced in most
places. 117 Criminalizing an activity through executive order that is not based on a statute or
ordinance raises legal and policy questions. 118
The third prong of our test considers time limits for business closures and mask measures
Neither the business closure measure nor the mask measure specifies a time limit. 119 Instead, the
executive orders establishing those measures provide that they shall expire upon the expiration of
the existing Miami-Dade County State of Local Emergency. 120 In addition, when the State of
Local Emergency is extended, those measures shall also be extended. 121 The lack of explicit
deadlines for the measures is a defect, although when the overall emergency expires, these specific
restrictions terminate as well.
It is reasonable and necessary for freedoms to be temporarily limited during a pandemic. 122
Government at all levels has been confronted with an unprecedented crisis and compelled to make
choices that affect public health, private rights, and the economic wellbeing of the states and the
nation. COVID-19 demanded decisions be made while science and circumstances were evolving
rapidly. For the future, we must learn from our experience and our mistakes. A central lesson is
to limit restrictions on personal freedoms unless truly necessary. And in our system, the courts
define the boundary between necessary and unnecessary intrusions on freedoms of movement,
property rights, and personal data rights.
3. JUDICIARY
Inevitably, courts are drawn to high-level conflicts involving government actions and
individual rights. United States courts have been asked to analyze and rule on various COVID-19
measures. Section IV of this article considers specific cases and limitations for federal testing
requirements, mortgage moratoriums and other policies. Courts have recognized limits on
pandemic policies but the courts often support for government policies based on the existence of
an emergency. 123 For example, a California superior court upheld the governor’s COVID-19
116
MIAMI-DADE, FLA., Emergency Order 20-16 (2020); Iván Espinoza-Madrigal, Don’t Criminalize the
Coronavirus, WBUR (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.wbur.org/cognoscenti/2020/04/16/police-coronavirus-ivanespinoza-madrigal.

Kristine Phillips, Many Face Mask Mandates go Unenforced as Police Feel Political, Economic Pressure (Sept.
16, 2020), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/09/16/covid-19-face-mask-mandates-go-unenforcedpolice-under-pressure/5714736002/.
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restrictions on religious gatherings in a suit filed by a local church. 124 In Power v. Leon County,
the Second Judicial Circuit Court in Florida denied a motion to enjoin Leon County’s mask
ordinance (this decision was upheld by the state’s First District Court of Appeal). 125 The plaintiff
argued that the ordinance violated guarantees of privacy, due process, religious freedom, and equal
protection under the Florida Constitution.126
Former New York Governor Andrew Cuomo was a party to a number of cases that challenged
his COVID-19 mandates. In Page v. Cuomo, 127 the United States District Court for the Northern
District of New York upheld the former New York Governor’s imposition of a two-week
quarantine order on people entering New York from states that have high levels of coronavirus. 128
In upholding the governor’s order, the federal judge cited support from the 1905 Supreme Court
case Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 129 In Jacobson, the Court upheld the authority
of states to enforce a compulsory vaccination order in Massachusetts when the government was
combatting a smallpox outbreak. 130 At that time, the city government in Cambridge,
Massachusetts, mandated that all adults be vaccinated against smallpox, and failure to do so would
result in a five-dollar fine. 131 Jacobson, which has previously been considered obscure, is back in
the spotlight, as some civil rights advocates fear vaccine mandates. 132
One of the New York cases made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roman
Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 133 which presented an array of issues suitable for a
constitutional law exam. The issues include the authority of states, the use of executive authority,
the deference of courts to the political branches in a technical setting, the definition of emergency,
and the limits of free exercise of religion. 134 The New York policy restricted gatherings to ten
individuals for locations in the red zone and twenty-five for locations in the orange zone. 135 The
per curiam majority concluded that the policy intruded on the free exercise of religion by limiting
https://ballotpedia.org/Lawsuits_about_state_actions_and_policies_in_response_to_the_coronavirus_(COVID19)_pandemic,_2020 (last visited Mar. 23, 2022).
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church gatherings. 136 The majority also concluded that the policy limiting religious gatherings
must survive strict scrutiny and recognized that controlling COVID was a compelling state
interest. 137 The Court decided that the policy failed by not being narrowly tailored and favoring
other gatherings. 138 In a concurring opinion, Justice Gorsuch noted that restrictions on houses of
worship violate the free exercise clause and said that the Constitution “cannot [take] a sabbatical”
during a pandemic. 139 The dissent by Justice Breyer argued that houses of worship are treated
equally with the same kind of secular gatherings and that the motion for temporary injunction
should be denied. 140 But even though the injunction was granted, it is clear that the Court
recognized the importance of government actions to control the pandemic. In his concurrence,
Justice Kavanaugh said:
To be clear, the COVID–19 pandemic remains extraordinarily serious and deadly. And at
least until vaccines are readily available, the situation may get worse in many parts of the
United States. The Constitution “principally entrusts the safety and the health of the
people to the politically accountable officials of the States” . . . . Federal courts therefore
must afford substantial deference to state and local authorities about how best to balance
competing policy considerations during the pandemic. 141
In the long term, while this case overturned a state action, it recognized clearly that there is a
compelling interest for government to address a pandemic.
Courts are reluctant participants in the COVID crisis but, nonetheless, are necessary to provide
boundaries. Even though courts defer to executive decisions and compelling interests of public
health and safety, the courts and the Constitution “cannot [take] a sabbatical” on issues of
individual liberty.
B. BRAZIL
Brazil and the United States have similar federal government systems, and both countries have
been significantly affected by COVID-19. In fact, Brazil has found itself at the center of the largest
COVID-19 outbreak in the Southern Hemisphere. 142
An analysis of Brazilian history,
government, and culture shows a striking similarity to the United States, and the country’s
handling of the COVID-19 pandemic provides a look into another federal government’s approach
to this pandemic.
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Brazil’s federal constitution asserts that during extraordinary circumstances that threaten the
health, peace, and safety of the Brazilian people, Congress can implement a state of emergency. 143
It can declare one of the following situations: state of calamity, state of emergency, state of siege,
and state of defense. 144 On March 20, 2020, Brazil’s Congress declared a state of public calamity
due to COVID-19. The measure was taken for financial reasons given that under a state of public
calamity, the federal government can increase public spending to combat the spread of damage, 145
and the federal administration did not have to meet the fiscal target established for 2020. 146 In
addition, emergency funds can be accessed, and States and municipalities can obtain assistance
from the federal government. 147
Restrictions of individual rights, freedoms, and constitutional guarantees can occur temporarily
during a state of public calamity. 148 Like American law, Brazilian law enlarges the executive
powers during states of emergency, 149 and it has an ambiguous definition of emergency and
emergency powers. 150
Like the United States, Brazilian courts are engaged in evaluating COVID policies. The courts
resolved disputes involving social gatherings, business closures, lockdowns, curfews, face
coverings, and COVID-19 mandates. 151 A lawsuit was even filed against Brazil’s president which
sought to require him to wear a face mask while in public. 152 Although the district court had ruled
in favor of the plaintiff, the decree was later overruled by the Court of Appeals, and the President
was not required to wear a mask. 153
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The pandemic resulted in controversial government intrusions in Brazil. Like the United
States, Brazil is a large diverse country with a wide a wide range of political views and diverse
cultures. The personality and culture of different regions and nations affects outcomes,
enforcement, and acceptance of governmental actions and policies. Culture is important. Laws
matter, but how individuals react to those laws may be even more critical.
III.

IS CULTURE MORE IMPORTANT THAN LAW IN RESPONDING TO A PANDEMIC?

The World Health Organization has stated that individual behavior is crucial to control the
spread of COVID-19. 154 Individual behavior is affected by laws and by culture. The pandemic
provides a global example of how individuals react to laws, leadership, and cultural practices.
Some nations followed legal restrictions on personal conduct, and some resisted the restrictions.155
In certain countries there is a culture of compliance, and in other countries, there is a culture of
defiance. Some of the explanation for defiance may be rooted in failures of governmental
leadership to persuade individuals to comply,156 but there are also basic cultural tendencies that
influence compliance.
Governments worldwide implemented similar restrictions, such as limiting private business
hours of operation and capacity, imposing travel bans, restraining school attendance, imposing
face coverings in public and private places, prohibiting large social gatherings, developing tracing
applications, and forcing mandatory quarantines. Each of these measures restricts personal
autonomy.
Because COVID-19 was a new virus with no ready cure, public health officials and
governments frequently followed the playbook used for other pandemics to combat COVID-19. 157
The focus was to isolate and limit human contact with the goal of “flattening the curve.” 158
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Flattening the curve is not curing the disease—it is buying time by preventing large spikes in
infection and reducing the burden on the healthcare system. 159
Culture and political structure influence individual compliance with COVID restrictions.
Political structures based on centralized authority or dictatorial power can expect a high rate of
compliance with a populace used to intrusion. If a governmental system has already achieved a
level of suppression of dissent and limited civil liberties, it will likely achieve a high level of
compliance in pandemic restrictions. Fear is a motivator. Governments that celebrate and support
civil liberties have a different issue. In a pluralistic society with a history of individualism,
compliance with broad government intrusions is questioned.
University of Maryland Professor of Psychology Michele Gelfand states that the world can be
divided into tight and loose cultures. 160 In a tight culture, social norms are clearly defined and
reliably imposed, leaving little room for individual improvisation and interpretation. 161 Loose
cultures have social norms that are flexible and informal. Loose cultures propose expectations but
permit individuals to define the range of tolerable behavior within which they may exercise their
own preferences. 162
A recent study published in Safety Science reveals that cultural determinants play an important
role in controlling infection behavior. 163 According to that study, countries with higher a
“Uncertainty Avoidance Index” will have the lower proportion of people gathering in public such
as retail and recreation, grocery and pharmacy, parks, transit stations, and workplaces. 164
Previous studies indicate that a tight culture is associated with success during natural disasters,
invasions, population density, and pathogen outbreaks. 165 For example, China, a country with a
tight culture, demands and receives compliance with restrictions. 166 A high compliance rate with
the government restrictions may explain China was able to control the spread of the first wave of
COVID-19 faster than most nations. 167
159
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Chinese society is a tight culture where government surveillance and intrusion is
commonplace. 168 Its highly regulated culture plays an important role when the government is
trying to enforce health measures during a pandemic. 169 Clearly there are factors connecting
culture and compliance such as cultural heritage of a community and reliance on government.
China illustrates how intrusive policies can prevail because of a combination of authoritarian
government and a culture of compliance. The Chinese government’s ability to forcibly vaccinate
is an example of the effectiveness of this combination. 170
In contrast, a loose culture will prioritize the privacy and individual freedom. There is evidence
that the spread of COVID-19 in the United States began in January 2020. 171 Yet the country
debated COVID-19 policies even as cases and deaths rose. 172 For example, in May 2020, armed
protesters took the streets of Michigan to protest the Governor’s order to extend the stay-at-home
and social distance mandates, as well as to protest business closures. 173 Undoubtedly, the
complicated and often confusing information about the pandemic prevented a consensus, but so
did the underlying culture of resisting governmental controls.
A lack of a unified approach was an important reason why COVID-19 spread. 174 A
decentralized decision-making process is fundamental part of federalist systems like that of the
United States, but decentralization can result in different policies in different jurisdictions. As
previously noted, some cities in 2020 were completely and quarantined, 175 while other states had
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/03/27/chinas-coronavirus-response-could-build-public-support-itsgovernment/ (noting how popular the COVID-tracking QR code is among Chinese residents).
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virtually no restrictions. 176 A positive consequence (at least for this article) is that the success of
different policies is observable since different locations can react differently to different
circumstances. The risk posed by decentralization is that some areas may choose to ignore good
policies.
In addition, decentralized decision-making causes jurisdiction issues. Can states supersede
cities’ determinations of mask ordinances? Can the federal government order a state to lift
restrictions on business? Can the federal government order a state to implement a stay-at-home
order? These legal issues are important to address as we consider how future pandemics might be
handled. The critical policy issue is whether this type of diverse decision-making works during a
pandemic. Ultimately, variations in policy makes sense because facts and circumstances vary
across jurisdictions, but some issues should be addressed through uniform, national policy.
State borders do not stop COVID-19 from spreading. Without uniform, national consensus or
direction, viruses will spread across governmental boundaries. 177 A 2009 study stated that British
and American citizens are unlikely to stay at home to work if they think that the risk of illness
transmission is uncertain. 178 Loose cultures with a commitment to individual liberty are a stark
contrast to tight cultures with dictatorial governments. 179 This reality is not an endorsement of
dictatorships as the best means to address pandemics. Rather, it is recognition that a national
emergency capable of crossing state boundaries requires national policies and guidance. In
addition to the national need, there is also a need for a mutual understanding of policies across
jurisdictions and how they should be shaped depending on each population. The policy appropriate
to a densely populated urban environment may be quite different from the policy in a small rural
city. 180
Latin American countries with loose cultures have nevertheless enacted strict lockdown
measures in response to severe COVID-19 outbreaks. In Honduras, the government instituted a
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nationwide centralized, militarized lockdown, devoid of oversight. 181 The lockdown allocated
specific days in which people could leave their homes to get food. 182 Similarly, Chile instituted a
strict curfew, and its residents must obtain a permit to leave home for very specific reasons. 183 In
Brazil, numerous local government placed travel barriers on city borders, restricting the circulation
of people as a response to COVID-19. 184 Additionally, interstate private transportation buses have
been restricted, and interstate roads have been closed. 185 Many citizens have also protested the
face covering impositions and movement-restrictions measures. 186
Compare the Latin American countries’ responses to the response of Asian countries’
responses. For residents in many Asian countries, some of which are tight-cultured countries,
wearing a mask and the government’s restrictions are not unusual and compliance is high.187
There is cultural acceptance and pressure to conform. However, residents of loose-cultured
countries have shown they are less likely to abide by government rules that implicate a limitation
of privacy or individual freedoms.
Government trustworthiness plays a crucial role in how countries deal with the pandemic.
Tight cultures have strong social norms, little tolerance for deviance, and higher individual trust
in government authority, while loose cultures are more permissive to varying social norms. 188 In
loose cultures, people can be politically polarized, which causes a divide in society and in society’s
reaction to government policies. 189 Moreover, studies show that tight cultures have “more law
enforcement per capita, desire greater media restriction, and endorse the use of any force necessary
to maintain law and order . . . and have higher conscientiousness.” 190 Conversely, looser cultures
181
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are more open and tolerate other culture’s values, beliefs, experiences and more concerned about
individual freedoms. 191
Therefore, privacy fears arose more in loose cultures when companies like Google, Facebook,
and Apple announced that they teamed up to create a contact tracing software application that
could be used by governments around the world. 192 The broad collection of personal data is an
example of the type of intrusion that is viewed differently in different cultures.
Cultural acceptance is a critical element of COVID policy. It is an important mission of
government to gain support of its population and, to do so, government must understand its own
culture. It is uncertain how governments will use the data collected, for how long the data will be
stored, and if governments will use it only for COVID-19 controlling measures.

IV.

LEGAL ISSUES IN A PANDEMIC – THE BASIS OF GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY AND THE
EFFECT ON INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

Protecting safety, security, and health is a fundamental element of the social contract.
Individuals give up certain liberties to be part of an ordered society. Restrictions range from
prohibiting using cell phones while driving to making assisted suicide unlawful. We pay taxes
with the expectation that we receive government services like education, national security, and
police protection. There are constitutional limits that are designed to prevent government from
inordinately invading civil liberties. In the United States, due process and liberty interests are
constitutionally protected, like they are in most democratic societies. 193 Emergencies like
COVID-19 stress the balancing of liberties and governmental duties to protect the health and
welfare of the entire community. 194
A. EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY
Because emergencies by their nature demand quick action, governments turn to executive
actions. That has been the case during the pandemic. Presidents, governors, and mayors are
granted emergency powers within their jurisdictions to protect the health and welfare of their
constituents. There are limitations on duration and limitation of authority as discussed above. 195
191
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The mode of policy making is through executive orders or proclamations as authorized by law. In
the pandemic, these executive policies clashed with individual rights on a regular basis. 196
At the federal level, the issue of extraordinary powers is supported by the executive power
through the Vesting Clause, 197 the Stafford Act, 198 and the Public Health Service Act. 199 The
Constitution makes it clear that general welfare is a pillar of the government. Considering that the
executive power is vested in the president, arguably the Vesting Clause grants the president the
authority to issue extraordinary measures aimed to protect the people. 200 Scholars refer to these
extraordinary powers as inherent powers of the president. 201 The Stafford Act provides legislative
authorization that grants the president wide authority to execute measures in order to save lives,
protect property, and ensure safety and health. 202 The Public Health Service Act authorizes the
Surgeon General, upon approval of the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), to make
and enforce measures in his judgment necessary to prevent the introduction, transmission, or
spread of communicable diseases. 203
The Commerce Clause 204 provides a constitutional basis for Congress to regulate emergencies
because they tend to affect interstate commerce or commerce with foreign nations. 205 According
to the Constitution, Congress can regulate “commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
states, and with the Indian tribes.” 206 The Constitution also recognizes the residual power of the
states and the states have exercised significant authority during the pandemic. 207
Similar to the exception powers granted to the United States government in states of
emergency, the Brazilian Constitution specifically authorizes several different types of emergency

Anthony F. DellaPelle, Constitutional Implications of COVID-19 and its Impact on Property Rights and Personal
Liberties, AM. BAR ASS’N, (July 27, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/real-estatecondemnation-trust/articles/2020/covid-19-constitutional-impact-property-rights-personal-liberties/.
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570–72 (1994).

200

201

Id. at 565.

202

42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–22 (2020).

203

42 U.S.C. §§ 264–272 (2020).

204

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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actions. 208 The exceptionality and the time limit are the main characteristics of Brazil’s State of
Exception measures, as restrictions on individual rights, freedom, and constitutional guarantees
can temporarily occur during its effectiveness. 209 Moreover, when a state of emergency is
declared, the extraordinary administration of power is concentrated in the federal branch and its
authority becomes very broad. 210 This concentration of power leads to fear of possible abuses
based on a presidential decision made during a state of emergency. In that scenario, the judiciary
will be the only organization capable of challenging the executive decision.
Governments across the world can and have been granted additional power to temporarily
curtail constitutional rights when dealing with a public health emergency. 211 Courts have
frequently supported emergency measures during this pandemic but have also recognized that
constitutions and human rights laws are not suspended during a pandemic. 212 However, as the
COVID-19 virus spread around the world, executive branches of governments gained power to
implement privacy-restrictive measures. 213 History teaches us that when society faces
emergencies and disasters, perceived public and collective interests will gain priority over
individual interests. At present, numerous scientists say that COVID-19 has no sign of ending and
future pandemics are a virtual certainly. 214 This future require that we examine the legal limits of
the intrusions that may occur during a pandemic.
B. RESTRICTIONS ON PERSONAL MOVEMENT: QUARANTINE, LOCKDOWN, AND TRAVEL
RESTRICTIONS
Restriction of personal movement is a basic strategy to fight a pandemic. Events that bring
people into closer contact increase the odds of transmitting the virus. That fact seems to be
confirmed by “super spreader events” that have resulted in the outbreak of multiple cases of the
virus. 215 Quarantines have long been held legal in the realm of infectious disease. 216 However,
quarantining has been more controversial during the COVID outbreak because of the skepticism
about the dangers of the disease.
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One strategy implemented to stop the rapid spread of COVID-19 in communities was
establishing lockdowns. 217 The term “lockdown” entails various practices like requiring
mandatory quarantines, recommending individuals stay at home, maintaining social distancing,
closing businesses, and banning events and gatherings. 218 At the end of 2019, when the first cases
of COVID-19 were detected in China, a lockdown seemed like an unlikely scenario. 219 Four
months later, lockdowns were the most common strategies to slow down the outbreak, forcing
millions of people across the world to isolate. 220
While some dispute the effectiveness of lockdowns, 221 it is certain that lockdowns raise legal
issues. The government has a duty to protect people’s health and security; however, the current
practices implemented represent a direct intrusion upon freedom of movement, which has been
found to be a fundamental right. 222 Balancing constitutional rights with public health requirements
is difficult but necessary.
Constitutional scholars argue that the Commerce Clause is a basis for regulating emergencies
and disasters that affect interstate commerce. 223 COVID-19 undeniably generated profound
impacts on commerce among the several states, in addition to compromising commerce
globally. 224 The rapidly increasing number of people infected and sudden deaths produced fear.
As a result, the exchange of goods and commodities had a sharp downturn both nationally and
internationally. 225 Economies took a downward turn, the stock market dropped, and thousands of
laborers were fired. 226
The freedom of movement is a recognized fundamental constitutional right under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, which states that “[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled
Stacey Lastoe, What quarantining around the world really looks like, CNN TRAVEL (Sept. 1, 2020),
https://www.cnn.com/travel/article/quarantining-around-the-world-reader-images/index.html.
217

Coronavirus disease (COVID-19): Herd immunity, lockdowns and COVID-19, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Dec. 31,
2020), https://www.who.int/news-room/q-a-detail/herd-immunity-lockdowns-and-covid-19.
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visited Apr. 11, 2022).
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to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.” 227 In Paul v. Virginia, the
Supreme Court defined freedom of movement as “right of free ingress to other States, and egress
from them.” 228 The COVID-19 lockdowns operate directly against the freedom of movement. By
being ordered to self-isolate, an individual’s right to free ingress and egress from other states was
directly limited.
According to the United States Code, individuals may be apprehended or detained to prevent
the introduction, transmission, or spread of a communicable disease. 229 The order depends on the
decision of the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, in consultation with the Surgeon General. 230 The law gives permission to the government
to apprehend and forcibly examine individuals reasonably believed to be infected in a qualifying
stage and reasonably believed to be moving or about to move from one state to another, or believed
to be a probable source of infection to individuals who are moving or are about to move to other
state. 231 Therefore, the government may have the authority to apprehend and forcibly examine a
contaminated individual in a pandemic.
However, the United States Code does not define the communicable disease. Based on the
vague text, any communicable disease could justify an executive order permitting apprehension
and forced examination. Some diseases would certainly justify such measures. Medical literature
confirms that Ebola is contagious, incredibly severe, and deadly. 232 An executive order allowing
the apprehension and forced examination of a person suspected to have Ebola seems justified.
Although the order would affect several constitutional rights, including the right of movement, the
lethal nature of Ebola provides a compelling state interest for the intrusion. Conversely, detaining
a person contaminated with a seasonal flu would be excessive. Future pandemics may provide
more difficult questions about when detaining infected individuals advances a compelling state
interest.
Thus far there is no movement to detain COVID-19 patients although an infected individual is
expected to quarantine in numerous jurisdictions. Could the US government require universal
testing for COVID-19? 233 The federal government did not require mandatory examinations for
227

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2; see also Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (1823).

228

75 U.S. 168, 180 (1869).

229
42 U.S.C. § 264(b) (2006). Though the United States federal government did not forcibly detain individuals
during the COVID-19 pandemic, it has previously indicated a willingness to do so “to prevent the entry and spread
of communicable diseases.” Legal Authorities for Isolation and Quarantine, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (last updated Sept. 17, 2021),
https://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/aboutlawsregulationsquarantineisolation.html.
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§ 264(b).
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Infra part IV(e).

History of Ebola Virus Disease, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (last updated May 27, 2021),
https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/history/summaries.html; Ebola Virus Disease, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Feb. 23,
2021), https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/ebola-virus-disease.
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swab in both sides of a person’s nose and twists for about fifteen seconds. Coronavirus (COVID-19) testing: What
you should know, U.C. DAVIS HEALTH (Nov. 23, 2020), https://health.ucdavis.edu/coronavirus/coronavirustesting.html.
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the general public, but perhaps in a future more severe pandemic, it might. 234 The federal
government did require more extensive action for government employees, who were required to
either sign a form attesting that they received the COVID-19 vaccine or to comply with strict rules
on mandatory masking, weekly testing, distancing, and more. 235 Other nations implemented
mandatory testing or conditioned travel on testing. For example, a test may be required to travel
by plane. 236 Conditioning travel on testing is far different than compelling a physical intrusion.
COVID-19 created an unprecedented global emergency where medical professionals
prescribed restrictions on personal movement to reduce the spread of the disease. 237 The challenge
is to balance individual rights to gather, travel, and freely move with the need to employ medically
necessary standards. The standards and definitions must be established.
C. RESTRICTIONS ON BUSINESS OPERATIONS: CLOSURES, REGULATED OCCUPANCY,
REGULATED OPERATIONS
Limiting and closing businesses has been a frequent feature of pandemic remedies and the
effect on individual businesses has been devastating. 238 Some estimates suggest 17% of
restaurants may be permanently out of business. 239
There are limitations on business closings and a general executive order mandating complete
business closure is likely unconstitutional. 240 The federal government did not issue any executive
order directing business closure during COVID-19, but there are arguments against general federal
authority to close businesses. The general due process language that provides “no person shall be
. . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,” 241 is a clear protection of
personal property. The federal government is prohibited from issuing orders taking away
individuals’ property without proper process. 242 Both the businesses per se and the incomes from
By utilizing the Vesting Clause, Commerce Clause and current statutes on emergencies and disasters. Supra
Section II. Infra notes 261 and 265 at 877.
234
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SCIS. 17656, 17656 (2020).
238

239
Restaurant Industry in Freefall; 10,000 Close in Three Months, NAT’L REST. ASS’N (Dec. 7, 2020),
https://restaurant.org/news/pressroom/press-releases/restaurant-industry-in-free-fall-10000-close-in.

Two centuries, supra note 205. Notably, it would not be unconstitutional if the business violated a valid U.S law
or an order from the Center for Disease Control and Prevention to implement certain safety measures. Id.
240

241

U.S. CONST. amend. V.

HENRY BRANNON, TREATISE ON THE RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 138 (1901).

242

80

LEGISLATION & POLICY BRIEF

businesses constitute property. However, if there is a compelling interest or if a business has
violated a federal law, a business could be penalized or closed. A business affecting interstate
commerce that directly affected welfare and safety would be subject to regulation; for example,
airlines could have passenger limits imposed. 243
Even in exceptional circumstances, the authority of the president has limits. In Youngstown
Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 244 President Truman issued an executive order directing the Secretary of
Commerce Sawyer to seize and operate most of the nation’s steel mills. 245 The act was issued
during the Korean War, and its objective was to avert the expected effects of a strike by the United
Steelworkers of America. 246 The Supreme Court of the United States held that the President did
not have the authority to issue such an order. 247 The holding is a strong statement for the
importance of private property and business even in times of crisis. 248 The Court added, “[t]he
President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed [Article II, Section 3] refutes the idea
that he is to be a lawmaker.” 249 The holding is a limitation on executive powers, even when based
on war powers. 250 Certainly there may be federal policies on business practices and policies based
on the effect on interstate commerce, but a general nationwide closing seems beyond the
enumerated or inherent powers of the federal government.
At the state level, however, business closure measures were widely utilized. During the
COVID-19 pandemic, at least forty-six out of the fifty states ordered non-essential businesses to
close. 251 Different states approached business closures differently, ranging from closure to
capacity limits.252 In New York, it was a total shutdown, but in Florida, there was no statewide
shutdown but there were local restrictions. 253 Depending on what your closure rules were, it
affected you economically. Unquestionably, limitations and closures have caused economic
hardship, but this hardship was also caused by COVID-19 health issues and general public fear.
Even though states have broad authority under police powers, lengthy or total closings may be
subject to constitutional issues, such as takings or due process arguments under the Fifth and
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Federal Aviation Administration chose not to require airlines to limit
capacity on flights, but such regulation could be an option in future health emergencies. Associated Press, U.S.
Officials Recommend—But Don’t Require—Masks on Planes, L.A. TIMES (July 2, 2020),
https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2020-07-02/airlines-rules-coronavirus-social-distancing.
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Fourteenth Amendments. In 4 Aces Enterprises. LLC v. Edwards,254 twenty-two Louisiana bar
owners filed a motion to enjoin Louisiana Governor John Bel Edwards and Louisiana State Fire
Marshal H. “Butch” Browning Jr. from enforcing orders banning the on-site consumption of food
and drinks at bars and determining closure of “non-essential” businesses. 255 The plaintiffs argued
they were denied substantive due process because the ban prevented them from profiting from
their businesses. 256 They also argued they were denied procedural due process because the bans
were issued without notice, and that this violated their equal protection rights because the ban
singled out their type of businesses. 257
Utilizing the precedents in Jacobson 258 and in re Abbott, 259 the court noted that the police
power precludes the judiciary “from second-guessing the wisdom or efficacy of measures taken
by state officials in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.” 260 The court recognized that the bar
owners have a constitutionally protected property interest in the profits of their own business, but
the presence of great danger like a pandemic justifies the ban. 261 The court noted that the bar
owners did not have the opportunity to be heard, but found no due process violation because of the
circumstances created by the COVID-19 pandemic. 262 Finally, the court found that singling-out
plaintiffs’ businesses was justified during the COVID-19 pandemic, citing testing data and
information from the White House Coronavirus Task Force. 263
Courts have also rejected the argument that temporary business closure orders during
COVID-19 constitute regulatory takings of private property. 264 In Friends of DeVito v. Wolf,265 a
group of Pennsylvania businesses and an individual filed a lawsuit against the Governor of
Pennsylvania, seeking to vacate an executive order determining the closure of all “non-lifesustaining” businesses.266 Petitioners argued that prohibiting the use of their property constituted
a taking of private property for public use without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth
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Amendment of the Constitution.267 Petitioners asserted that the principle governing their claim is
found in Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council.268
In Lucas, the state of South Carolina enacted a law preventing the plaintiff from erecting
permanent habitable structures on his land. 269 The law aimed to protect erosion and destruction of
barrier islands. 270 The issue was whether the law’s “dramatic effect on the economic value of
Lucas’ lots accomplished a taking of private property under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
requiring the payment of ‘just compensation.’” 271 According to the Court, “when the owner of
real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the
common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.” 272 The
Court held that the law rendered Lucas’ property valueless, constituting a taking, and thus
requiring just compensation pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 273
However, the Friends of DeVito court found that Lucas did not apply to COVID-19 business
closures. 274 According to the court, while the law litigated in Lucas imposed a permanent ban on
Lucas’ property, the measures implemented during COVID-19 were temporary. 275 Following
precedent from Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, the
Court held that temporary restrictions do not constitute regulatory takings. 276 In Tahoe, the Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency imposed two moratoria, totaling thirty-two months, on development in
the Lake Tahoe Basin while formulating a land-use plan for the area. 277 The Court held that the
mere enforcement of the moratoria did not constitute per se a regulatory taking of private
property. 278 Rather, whether a taking occurred required evaluating a set of standards, such as
landowners’ expectations, actual impact, public interest, and reasons behind the action. 279
Notwithstanding the decision in Friends of DeVito, the holding in Tahoe demonstrates that it
is not only the length of the restrictions that determine whether a taking occurred, but the
assessment of a set of standards. The same rationale applied in Arkansas Game & Fish
Commission v. United States. 280 The Supreme Court evaluated whether a government action was
267
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a taking under the Fifth Amendment by weighing a number of factors including the length of the
taking, the severity of the taking’s interference, the intention behind the taking, and the
foreseeability of the taking. 281 The Court also noted that the assessment of a taking would also
depend on its duration. If a taking is permanent, the Court’s main concern will be the economic
impact on the property taken. However, if the taking is temporary, the Court will conduct a general
analysis by looking at the length, severity, economic impact, intention, and foreseeability of the
government action to determine if there was a taking. 282
The majority of the COVID-19 implemented measures are temporary, lasting as long as the
virus poses a threat for the public health. Therefore, the analysis for whether a business closure
order constitutes a regulatory taking should be determined using the factors the Supreme Court
provided in Tahoe and Arkansas Game. Business closure orders during COVID-19 have produced
severe financial impacts, causing the highest unemployment rate observed since 1948. 283 The
financial sacrifices imposed onto individuals during COVID-19 must have a limit. Tahoe and
Arkansas Game provide those limits and help provide a roadmap for courts to determine whether
business closures during COVID-19 are, in fact, temporary government takings under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments.
Eviction moratoriums triggered the Contract Clause, which asserts that “No State shall . .
. make any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.” 284
The denial of evictions affected a number of contracts by denying landlords the ability to collect
rent from paying tenants and prohibiting the eviction of tenants that refused to pay. There are
other historic instances of emergencies that justified the government’s impairment of contracts.
For example, during the Great Depression, mortgage foreclosures were suspended. 285 The
Supreme Court found that the policy for suspending mortgage foreclosures was necessary for
public policy. 286 However, even if foreclosures and evictions are suspended, their suspension
cannot be indefinite. They cannot be perpetual. They must be reasonable, which means they
must terminate.
The Supreme Court has already held that the eviction moratorium, put in place to account for
the financial hardships during COVID-19, could not extend past July 31, 2021. In Alabama
Association of Realtors v. Department of Health & Human Services, 287 the Court found in favor
of landlords, rental property managers, and relators challenging the nationwide ban on evictions

281

Id. at 38-39.

282

Id.

GENE FALK ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46554, UNEMPLOYMENT RATES DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC 2
(last updated Aug. 20, 2021).
283

284

U.S. CONST. art.1, §10, cl.1.

Geoff Walsh, Analysis of Constitutional Issues Related to Foreclosure Crisis-Driven State Relief Laws, NAT’L
CONSUMER L. CTR. 1, 2–3 (Feb. 2009), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/mediation/modelforeclosure-crisis-driven.pdf.
285

286

Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 476 (1934).

287

141 S. Ct. 2485 (2021).

84

LEGISLATION & POLICY BRIEF

implemented by the CDC, holding that the moratorium constituted an unconstitutional intrusion
on landlords’ interest in property ownership and exceeded CDC’s statutory authority. 288
Prior to this case being appealed to the Supreme Court, the District Court for the District of
Columbia held that the CDC exceeded the authority provided in § 361 of the Public Health Service
Act. 289 As a result, the District Court granted the plaintiff’s motion for expedited summary
judgment, thus vacating the nationwide eviction moratorium. 290 The CDC sought to stay the
vacation order pending appeal. 291 The District Court granted the motion to stay. 292 According to
the court, the CDC failed to show likelihood of success on the merits, but it has made a showing
of (1) irreparable injury related to the lifting of state-implemented eviction moratoriums; (2)
possibility to recover landlord’s financial losses; and (3) public interest weighing in favor of the
stay due to the extraordinary public moment. 293
Plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court determined whether the CDC exceeded
its existing statutory authority by issuing a nationwide eviction moratorium. 294 The justices
unanimously agreed that the CDC lacked authority to implement a nationwide eviction
moratorium. 295 However, the Court decided to keep the moratorium in effect until July 31,
2021. 296 This decision sets the precedent that the CDC cannot issue or extend nationwide eviction
moratoriums without congressional authorization.
However, even though the Court noted the CDC lacked the authority to issue or extend a
nationwide eviction moratorium, the Court did not address the constitutional grounds alleged by
the plaintiffs in Alabama Association of Realtors. Therefore, the claims on unlawful taking of
private property and violation of due process remain uncertain in the pandemic context. 297
D. RESTRICTIONS ON PERSONAL CONDUCT: MASKING REQUIREMENTS AND
ADMINISTRATING VACCINES
Two issues that have generated great controversy are mask and vaccine mandates. As vaccines
became available and more broadly utilized, vaccinated individuals were able to not wear masks.
In some jurisdictions, identification proving vaccination was required to access certain public
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places and commercial establishments. 298 For example, the Israeli green passport, which can be
downloaded to a smart phone, serves many purposes, including access to gyms, hotels, theaters,
and workplaces. 299 In March 2021, New York launched a similar system through its Excelsior
Pass, a government-issued vaccine passport. 300
Masking and vaccines mandates are not new. The United States Supreme Court ruled on
compulsory vaccination in 1905 in Jacobson v. Massachusetts. 301 However, scholars argue that
Jacobson is not a strong precedent for broad compulsory vaccination policies because the penalty
in that case was a small fine, and other manners of compulsory vaccination—such as those that
limit children’s access to public schools—involve more significant depravations of liberty.302
These arguments suggest that a nationwide compulsory vaccination would likely be challenged on
constitutional grounds. Facial masks were also required when the influenza pandemic raged across
the United States in 1918 and 1919. 303 After a century, some governments continue to argue for
masks, 304 and some governments and individuals argue against them, claiming violation of
personal freedom and social control. 305
There are three arguments that have been used to resist mask wearing: freedom of speech,
freedom of movement, and violation of privacy. 306 The first is based on a violation of the First
Amendment’s freedom of speech. 307 Under this theory, masks create a barrier to sharing ideas,
thereby abridging the freedom of speech. 308 As of this writing, several courts have addressed and
rejected this argument.
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In Antietam Battlefield KOA v. Hogan, 309 plaintiffs asked the Federal District of Maryland
court to enjoin the governor’s executive orders mandating use of facial masks. The court denied
the request to enjoin. 310 Quoting Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 311 the court
argued that “real liberty for all could not exist under the operation of a principle which recognizes
the right of each individual person to use his own, whether in respect of his person or his property,
regardless of the injury that may be done to others.” 312 This language embodies the reasoning that
policies implemented during the pandemic can impair individual freedoms to protect the welfare
of the general public. Moreover, the court asserted that “[t]o overturn the Governor's orders, those
who disagree with them must show that they have ‘no real or substantial relation’ to protecting
public health, or that they are ‘beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by
the fundamental law.’” 313 However, it did not interpret the mandatory use of masks as a “plain,
palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental [right to freedom of speech].” 314 The court
concluded that the orders at issue regulated conduct, not speech, 315 and that the executive orders
do not restrain the speech of a certain group of people or of certain content. The orders merely
regulate a conduct aiming to protect public health. 316
The second argument relates to the freedom of movement. 317 Individuals argue that mandating
masks compels a person to decide to either wear a facial covering or stay home. 318 No case has
upheld this argument yet. In comparison to the lockdown and business closure measures,
mandatory masking is less restrictive. The mandatory masking measures will most likely end as
the pandemic fades away. Based on our three-prong test, 319 mandatory masking orders are
constitutional if there is a serious communicable disease that poses a severe risk to the public
health.
The impact of vaccinations adds another issue to the discussion of personal intrusions. Despite
the global effort to develop a vaccine able to combat the SARS-CoV-2 infection and end the
pandemic, some of the challenges that countries face are vaccine skepticism and privacy concerns.
A survey conducted from November 30 to December 8, 2020 revealed that 27% of the public is
vaccine hesitant, saying they probably not or definitely would not get a COVID-19 vaccine even
309
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if it were available for free and deemed safe by scientists. 320 Vaccine hesitancy is highest among
Republicans (42%), those ages 30–49 (36%), and rural residents (35%). 321
Brazil has a history of vaccine mandates. Brazil mandated vaccines during the smallpox
outbreak of 1904, 322 which was the catalyst to the rebellion known as the Vaccine Revolt. 323
Failure to get vaccinated resulted in severe penalties, including fines for non-compliance. 324
Brazilians were required to have a vaccination certificate to have access to public education and
employment in public institutions.325 Vaccination certificates were even required to get married
and for travel. 326 Additionally, sanitary officials and police officers were authorized to enter
private residences to vaccinate the residents. 327
After the riots, the Brazilian government suspended the obligatory nature of the vaccination
program, 328 and the smallpox vaccination was slowly incorporated into daily life in Rio de Janeiro
and other main cities of Brazil. 329 While there was considerable opposition to the forced
vaccinations in Brazil, the government did ultimately succeed in reducing mortality rates, reaching
near zero in 1906. 330
Brazil also experienced resistance to compelled vaccinations during the COVID-19 pandemic.
A legal challenge regarding compelled vaccinations was filed in the Brazil Supreme Court even
before the vaccine was approved in the country. 331 The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of mandatory vaccination and held that it is constitutional for the state to impose restrictive
measures such as fines, prohibitions to be in certain places, or requirements to enroll children in
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school. 332 However, the State cannot forcibly immunize its citizens. 333 According to Justice Luís
Roberto Barroso, although the Brazilian federal constitution protects the right of every citizen to
maintain their philosophical, religious, moral and existential convictions, society's rights must
prevail over individual rights. 334 Therefore, the state can, in exceptional situations, protect people,
even against their will. 335
In the United States, employers are allowed to require that their employees be vaccinated.
For example, Delta Airlines has been permitted to require new employees be vaccinated. 336 The
District Court for the Southern District of Texas allowed a hospital to require all employees—
regardless of tenure—be vaccinated. 337 These decisions were bolstered by a release by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, which said that federal equal employment opportunity
laws do not prevent an employer from requiring all employees physically entering the workplace
to be vaccinated for COVID-19, so long as they provide reasonable accommodations. 338
In the wake of the spike in COVID-19 cases due to the rise of the Delta variant, many
health advocates sought to expand policies to include mandatory vaccinations. Congress could
not reach any agreement on mandatory vaccinations. 339 The executive branch sought a “work
around” to Congressional action through administrative agency rulemaking. 340 Both the
Secretary of Labor and the Secretary of Health and Human Services issued vaccine mandates. 341
On behalf of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the Secretary
of Labor promulgated a regulation that all employers with 100 or more employees must (1)
332
S.T.F.-D.F. 6586, Ação Direta De Inconstitucionalidade No. 0106444-70.2020.1.00.0000, Relator: Min. Ricardo
Lewandowski, 17.12.2020, SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL JURISPRUDÊNCIA [S.T.F.J.], 07.04.2021 (Braz.).
333

Id.

334

Id.

335

Id.

The Associated Press, Delta Will Require New Hires to Be Vaccinated Against Virus, WFLA NEWS CHANNEL 8
(May 14, 2021, 1:44 PM), https://www.wfla.com/community/health/coronavirus/delta-will-require-new-hires-to-bevaccinated-against-virus/.
336

337

Bridges v. Houston Methodist Hosp., 543 F. Supp. 3d 525, 526–28 (S.D. Tex. June 12, 2021).

What You Should Know About COVID-19 and the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and Other EEO Laws, U.S.
EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (June 28, 2021), https://www.eeoc.gov/wysk/what-you-should-know-aboutcovid-19-and-ada-rehabilitation-act-and-other-eeo-laws.
338

See Tony Romm, Senate votes to repeal key Biden administration vaccine and testing policy, WASH. POST (Dec.
8, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2021/12/08/republicans-vaccine-congress-coronavirus/.
339

The Editorial Board, The Vaccine Mandate ‘Work-Around’ May Run Aground, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 7, 2022),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-work-around-may-go-aground-supreme-court-john-roberts-biden-vaccinemandate-covid-osha-elizabeth-prelogar-11641597592.
340

Secretary Becerra to Require COVID-19 Vaccinations for HHS Health Care Workforce, H.H.S. PRESS OFF.
(Aug. 12, 2021), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2021/08/12/secretary-becerra-to-require-covid-19-vaccinationsfor-hhs-health-careworkforce.html#:~:text=To%20increase%20vaccination%20coverage%20and,be%20vaccinated%20against%20CO
VID%2D19; Summary of COVID-19 Vaccination and Testing ETS, OCCUPATION SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN.,
https://www.osha.gov/sites/default/files/publications/OSHA4162.pdf (last visited May 8, 2022).
341

Vol. 11.1

LEGISLATION & POLICY BRIEF

89

ensure all employees are vaccinated against COVID-19 or (2) require employees to wear a mask
at work and take weekly COVID-19 tests. In reviewing the employer mandate, the U.S.
Supreme Court determined that the Occupational Safety and Health Act did not “empower[] the
Secretary [of Labor] to set . . . [such] broad public health measures.” 342 Rather, the Act only
allowed OSHA to regulate work-related dangers. 343 The Court explained that COVID-19 is not
a work-related danger because the virus is “no different from the day-to-day dangers that all face
from crime, air pollution, or any number of communicable diseases.” 344 Moreover, the employer
mandate “would significantly expand OSHA’s regulatory authority without clear congressional
authorization.” 345 Joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, Justice Gorsuch wrote a concurring
opinion to emphasize the lack of Congressional authorization, arguing that the power to pass
COVID-19 legislation rests with the States and Congress, not OSHA. 346 Ultimately, the decision
to stay the employer mandate rested on the Court’s concern over the separation of powers and
the lack of legislative authorization. The decision leaves open the question of whether another
agency could pass COVID-19 regulations if authorized by Congress.
A second regulation, an interim final rule (IFR), was codified by the Secretary of Health
and Human Services. 347 This IFR required the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
(CMS) Mandate certified facility providers to ensure their staff were fully vaccinated. Here, the
Executive branch was acting under authority that Congress had previously conferred under the
spending power. 348 The U.S. Supreme Court permitted the vaccine mandate to stay in effect
pending resolution of the case. 349 The Court stated that Congress granted the Secretary of Health
and Human Services the authority over the Medicare and Medicaid programs and authority to
promulgate “health and safety” regulations to administer the programs effectively. 350 Further,
requiring vaccination in this context was “necessary for the health and safety of individuals to
whom care and services are furnished,” as most of the patients were elderly and therefore
particularly vulnerable to COVID-19. 351 Although the Court noted that “the challenges posed by
a global pandemic do not allow a federal agency to exercise power that Congress has not
conferred upon it,” the Court acknowledged the need for compromise in the medical realm
during unprecedented times. 352
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These U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions regarding the vaccine mandates reflect divergent
views on the government’s role in the COVID-19 pandemic. On the one hand, the Court’s
rejection of the employer mandate suggests that the government is limited in its control over
private entities and that only Congress or the states can exert that control. On the other hand, in
the context of Medicare and Medicaid, the Court held that the government could compel
vaccinations where a heightened risk would affect government program funding. These two
decisions can be viewed as consistent because the Court concluded that the Medicare and
Medicaid programs were justified under the spending clause whereas the OSHA based
requirements applied broadly and was found to be done without Congressional authorization.
The continuing uncertainty over who has the authority to pass vaccine mandates suggests that
Congress should articulate the path for decision-making during the remainder of the COVID-19
pandemic and for any future pandemics.
While lockdowns, business closures, and mandatory masking orders are likely to disappear,
the intrusions enforced upon privacy rights may remain intact as society moves into the new
normal. Because people tend to accept privacy intrusions to address emergencies, 353 it is critical
to prevent short-term acceptance during an emergency from becoming long-term privacy
intrusions.
E. INTRUSIVENESS OF PREVAILING MEDICAL PROTOCOLS FOR RESPONDING TO A
PANDEMIC
Logically, emergency measures taken through the declaration of a state of calamity or a state
of emergency should stop when the emergency ends. But, when does the threat to public health
end when there is a pandemic like COVID-19?
While there is not a political consensus, there appears to be some medical consensus on
how to react to the COVID-19 pandemic. Public health specialists have used the Testing, Treating,
and Tracking Method (“The TTT Method”) in pandemics for decades, including the 1918 flu
pandemic. 354 Additionally, the medical community generally accepts quarantines and mandatory
vaccinations and masking as means of abating a pandemic; however, these methods are the subject
of political and legal controversy that we will discuss in another section of this article. 355
A consensus is easier to reach for testing, treating, and tracking. Given the rising number of
administered COVID-19 tests, 356 the public seems accepting of testing, virtually everyone who is
sick wants to be treated, and individuals are likely to want to know if they were exposed to the
353

Cf. Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Dep’t of Lab., 142 S. Ct. 661, 669–670 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).

354
Douglas Jordan, The Deadliest Flu: The Complete Story of the Discovery and Reconstruction of the 1918
Pandemic Virus, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (last updated Dec. 17, 2019),
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/reconstruction-1918-virus.html; Nina Strochlic & Riley D. Champine,
How some cities ‘flattened the curve’ during the 1918 flu pandemic, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Mar. 27, 2020),
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/article/how-cities-flattened-curve-1918-spanish-flu-pandemiccoronavirus.
355

Supra Section IV(d).

356
Total COVID-19 Tests, OUR WORLD IN DATA (last updated May 5, 2022),
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/full-list-total-tests-for-covid-19 (documenting the number of COVID-19 test
administered to the public).

Vol. 11.1

LEGISLATION & POLICY BRIEF

91

virus. Each of these activities involves some intrusion and the gathering of personal information.
Testing and treating are a part of virtually all medical procedures. The pandemic makes tracking
an important part of the public health formula. But tracking, particularly with new technologies,
can be intrusive.
The TTT Method is a result of practices developed during other historical disease outbreaks,357
like cholera, typhoid, influenza, tuberculosis, diphtheria, polio, measles, HIV, and the former
coronavirus. 358 Some of these diseases have been controlled, and some of them still cause
thousands of deaths annually. 359 Based on history, acceptance in the medical community, and
agreement of the general public, when the next pandemic occurs tracking, treating and tracing will
be first steps.
Testing. Public health officials have pressed for increased testing from the beginning of the
pandemic. 360 Testing not only identifies individuals who need treatment, but can also identify
geographical outbreaks that may require more general controls and emergency measures. 361
COVID testing garners less enthusiasm because of skepticism about the severity of the disease
itself. Not all people who have COVID-19 have symptoms of COVID-19, which makes
persuading people to take tests harder. 362 An individual can be infected and asymptomatic, which
means that individual may not feel ill but he or she may spread the virus to others. 363 Many COVID
cases have mild symptoms, so the need for the test may not be apparent to the individual while
other COVID cases are severe and require hospitalization. 364 Therefore, mass testing is about
more than just the individual health of a person—it is a priority to prevent spread of the virus. 365
Testing identifies individuals who are infected. Once identified, that infected individual should
quarantine and must identify individuals who may have exposed to the virus. 366 Once an individual
is diagnosed, it follows that he or she will experience significant intrusions into his or her personal
357
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life. People may find their personal movements restricted and their health care records examined.
Health authorities will want to know about the individual’s contacts with other persons.
Treating. After receiving a positive result, health authorities may encourage individuals to
initiate treatment. 367 The seriously ill will seek treatment from the stressed health care systems. 368
However, many individuals with the disease do not require extensive treatment. 369
The rules of confidentiality change during a pandemic. Health officials need to know the
characteristics of the individuals affected to better understand how the virus affects different
groups. 370 Thus, privacy gives way to the emergency needs of a pandemic. The personal
information of those treated for COVID-19 is part of a database used to predict impacts, to inform
treatments, and to control the spread of the virus. 371 However, there can and should be rational
limits; health professionals should have limited access to some information while other
information could be anonymized.
Tracking. Tracking and contact tracing have always been a part of pandemic response.
Traditional tracking practice involves a healthcare official to fill out forms with a patient’s
information. 372 Tracking entails obtaining intrusive personal information including the patient’s
movements, home and work addresses, people contacted, allergies, infirmities, and sampling. 373
Now, that information can be collected more efficiently through technology. Government tracking
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of an individual 24-7, for example through a GPS device, requires a warrant in a criminal
investigation. 374 Tracking is potentially highly intrusive.
Artificial intelligence with data from contact-tracing apps, temperature-sensing cameras, and
location detection technology is now a significant tool to fight a pandemic. 375 COVID-19 spawned
a staggering number of surveillance technologies that have been launched and accepted across the
world. 376 The heightened sense of danger to public health supports using more intrusive new
technology. Consequently, the question arises: how long will data collected and produced to fight
the pandemic be maintained? Clearly governments must address the public health emergency, and
the general public sentiment is to protect health risks while there is limited public outcry to protect
privacy. Ultimately, policy for the next pandemic must address limitations on data use and storage.
Some countries, including China, South Korea, and Singapore quickly began using advanced
technology to impose quarantine measures and maintain social distancing through location
devices. 377 For instance, China’s residents are assigned a QR code based on a combination of big
data consisting of information submitted by the users themselves and by third parties. 378 China
also utilizes thermal cameras that can identify individual’s body temperatures from a distance and
immediately notify authorities if abnormalities are detected. 379 Other cameras verify whether
people are obeying social distance policies in public spaces. 380
Other countries have begun to rely on technologies such as contact tracing and notification
apps. Contact tracing apps can trace our movements constantly, relying on the GPS embedded in

374
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grip on citizens, AMNESTY INT’L (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/04/how-china-usedtechnology-to-combat-covid-19-and-tighten-its-grip-on-citizens/ (detailing China’s use of new technology to combat
Covid-19).
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all cell phones. 381 With the apps, individuals can upload their personal information, including their
live location, through applications downloaded on their cellphones and the apps may send an
“exposure notification” if the individual has encountered someone carrying the virus. 382
The developer of the contact tracing app can identify the user of the app, while the developer
of the contact notification app can pseudonymizes the user. 383 Thus, the developer of the contact
notification app will arguably have access to an individual’s personal information, but it will not
be able to identify the individual. Another difference between contact tracing apps and contact
notification apps relates to the device utilized to verify the exposure. Contact tracing apps utilize
the GPS embedded in cellphones. 384 By knowing a phone’s current location, the app should be
able to identify whether the owner has come in contact with an individual who has tested positive
for COVID-19. 385 On the other hand, contact notification apps utilize Bluetooth. 386 An owner’s
phone and the phone of the individual close to him or her will exchange information. 387 If the
individual close to the owner has tested positive and has informed the app, the owner will receive
an “exposure notification.” 388
Google and Apple partnered to create an exposure notification application-programming
interface (API) that can be used by different apps for contact tracing. 389 More than forty countries
launched Google and Apple’s API apps. 390 The two tech giants argue that their contact notification
apps are privacy protective because the user will be pseudonymized and because individuals would

381
Mobile Location Data and COVID-19: Q&A, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 13, 2020),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/13/mobile-location-data-and-covid-19-qa.

Privacy-Preserving Contact Tracing, APPLE, https://covid19.apple.com/contacttracing (last visited Apr. 6, 2022)
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not be traced constantly. 391 Instead, their personal information would be exchanged with
cellphones of individuals they are in close proximity to only for a certain period of time.
There is also a concern about what information is considered COVID-related and should be
collected; Apple and Google would define what information is COVID-19 related for their
technology. 392 The definition will probably be crafted in complicated terms and injected into
digital terms of agreement. Usually, users tend not to read through before clicking “I agree,”393
but the next “I agree” may put the user’s privacy at increased risk.
Moreover, apprehension concerning where the data will be stored is also a factor. In terms of
data storage, we may categorize apps as centralized and decentralized. Centralized apps will
concentrate all the information collected into one single database that is controlled by the
government. 394 On the other hand, decentralized apps promise to keep personal information stored
on the individual’s phone. 395 Countries such as Austria, Croatia, Denmark, Ireland, and Italy
implemented decentralized apps in order to track the spread of COVID-19. 396
In the United States, governmental monitoring of individual movement without a warrant is
unconstitutional. 397 In United States v. Jones, 398 the Supreme Court held that, under the Fourth
Amendment, “longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on
expectation of privacy.” 399 The case involved the warrantless installation of a GPS on the
defendant’s vehicle in order to produce evidence of the investigated crime. 400 However, it is
important to note that the Fourth Amendment protection does not apply to the private sector.401
The private surveillance industry has the ability to gather personal information without the Fourth
Amendment restrictions placed on the government restrictions. 402 The industry may end up
sharing the personal information collected with anyone consistent with terms of service, including,
Reed Albergotti, Apple and Google Expand Coronavirus Warning Software, WASH. POST (Sept. 1, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/09/01/apple-google-exposure-notification-express/.
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in certain circumstances, the government. 403 Decentralized apps might be more intrusive to
privacy than they appear.
During COVID-19, the world opted for the security and convenience provided by contacttracing apps at the expense of privacy. 404 With the growing use of contact-tracing apps, individuals
potentially forfeit their protected right to privacy in their movement. The convenience of the apps
provides for an excellent way to slow the spread of COVID-19. In the long term, future policies
should assure that contact-tracing data is only used for medical purposes and that when the data is
no longer valuable for that purpose, it should be destroyed. With the growing number of personal
privacy breaches in recent years, it only makes sense to set policies to assure that data gathered in
health emergencies cannot be abused. 405
The ability to undermine privacy rights is proportional to the importance that society places on
individual privacy. Privacy and individual liberty are accepted rights in the United States and
internationally. Legally, privacy and individual liberty can be a fundamental right in some
instances. As a fundamental right, government must show the highest level of justification—a
compelling state interest for the intrusion. There is no doubt that tracking can be an intrusion, as
can other issues raised by COVID. The legal issue is how much tracking information is justified
in fighting a deadly pandemic and how to limit the intrusion while fulfilling the public health
needs.

V.

THE NEXT PANDEMIC: BLUEPRINT TO PROTECT HEALTH AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

The reaction to the COVID-19 pandemic has been chaotic and uneven. Different nations made
different decisions with different consequences. We can learn from the mistakes, and we can learn
from what worked. With the perspective of hindsight, we can make better policies for the next
pandemic.
A. DEFINE THE THREAT LEVEL OF A PANDEMIC WITH A CREDIBLE AND
SCIENTIFICALLY SOUND PROCESS
Misunderstanding, lack of information, disinformation, lies, and social media created
misunderstanding and confusion that harmed the response to COVID-19. The exact nature of
COVID-19 was initially a matter of scientific uncertainty and, therefore, was subject to different
responses from government leaders. Unfortunately, initial ambiguity established a platform for
See Patrick Howell O’Neill et al., A flood of coronavirus apps are tracking us. Now it’s time to keep track of
them., MIT TECH. REV. (May 7, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/05/07/1000961/launching-mittrcovid-tracing-tracker/.
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SOC’Y (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.benton.org/headlines/50-million-facebook-profiles-harvested-cambridgeanalytica-major-data-breach.
405

Vol. 11.1

LEGISLATION & POLICY BRIEF

97

continuing confusion. 406 A major goal in addressing a future pandemic is establishing a credible
means of defining the threat level of a disease and thereby establishing justifications for making
certain policy decisions.
While institutions like the CDC exist currently to make these assessments, it would be wise
to create a commission of experts with broad public credibility to present conclusions and
assessments specifically targeted toward pandemic response. Time is of the essence when
addressing pandemics, so such an entity would need to create solution frameworks in advance and
need to be designed to respond quickly to emerging health crises. A major issue is public
acceptance and understanding of the threat. A centralized and predetermined classification system
could aid in accomplishing this goal: if the criterion for severe diseases is determined and
published in advance, the public is more likely to believe declarations of threat assessments.
Official declarations of emergency would be less likely to be interpreted as political posturing or
panicked overreaction; instead, declarations of emergency will be verifiable and use familiar,
preexisting standards. In other words, by establishing the criteria and process for defining a threat
before the threat occurs, it is more likely that the emergency responses that follow will be readily
accepted.
The following standards, which are utilized by the WHO when assessing the existence of
a Public Health Emergency of International Concern, could be the basis for assessing public health
emergencies: (1) is the number of cases and/or deaths for this type of event large for the given
place, time or population; (2) does the event have potential to have a high public health impact; or
(3) is cooperation among states needed to detect, investigate, respond and control the current event,
or prevent new cases? 407 To assess whether the event has the potential to have a high public health
impact, the following criteria identified by medical experts may be applied: (1) the event is caused
by a pathogen with high potential to cause an epidemic (infectiousness, fatality, multiple
transmission routes or carriers); (2) there is an indication of treatment failure (new or emerging
antibiotic resistance, (3) vaccine failure, antidote resistance or failure); (4) there are cases reported
among health staff; (5) the event is in an area with high population density; and (6) the population
at risk is especially vulnerable (e.g., refugees, low level immunization, children, elderly, low
immunity, undernourished). 408 The classification system could sort pandemics into “levels,” as we
do with hurricanes, earthquakes, and tornadoes. 409 The pandemic classification system should
rely on specific, measurable data points. The chart to the below shows how the CDC utilizes

See, e.g., Erika Edwards, Do you need a mask? The science hasn't changed, but public guidance might, NBC
News (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/do-you-need-mask-science-hasn-t-changedpublic-guidance-n1173006.
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transmissibility and severity to classify pandemics. 410 A commission should evaluate these metrics
for use in their pandemic scale and report.
Transmissibility addresses the disease’s ability to spread, and severity addresses the
damage the disease inflicts. 411 A
disease with high transmissibility but
low severity, such as the common
cold, does not warrant exercise of
emergency powers, while a disease
with low transmissibility but high
severity could warrant the exercise of
emergency powers in localized
settings. 412 As the above CDC chart
shows, the 1918 Spanish Flu
Epidemic was highly dangerous.
There are other pandemics and
epidemics that would be categorized
as a high threat level, for instance,
Ebola. The Ebola virus disease is
rare, yet severe, and has a death rate
of up to 90% in humans. The danger
provided by Ebola made it easier for
society to accept intrusions upon individuals with the disease. 413 The public is likely to accept the
application of quarantine, mandatory use of masks, and tracking measures if a threat as severe as
Ebola arose, and the existence of the threat was credibly described. If we can generally accept the
concept of a Category 5 hurricane, a category 4.5 Earthquake, or a category F5 tornado, then the
public can accept a category 9 pandemic.
1. A STANDING PANDEMIC COMMISSION
As we have recently seen with COVID-19, a pandemic can strangle the resources, the rule
of law, and the will of even the most technologically advanced countries. 414 To mitigate these
concerns, we suggest the United States create a standing pandemic commission with the goal of
Carrie Reed et al., Novel Framework for Assessing Epidemiol Effects of Influenza Epidemics and Pandemics,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Dec. 20, 2012), https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/19/1/12-0124-f3.
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appointing sixteen non-partisan members. The conscious effort to avoid partisan imbalance is a
critical aspect of its formation, so that the commission can have the greatest possible acceptance
from the people. While there is always a risk of divisions in a commission, the risk of a
misinformed general public during a lethal pandemic is even greater. There is a rational hope that
the high stakes for the country will bring commissioners together for the public welfare.
The commission’s initial task would be to connect the medical community’s assessment
framework for grading pandemics with a potential response matrix the government could legally
implement to mitigate likely consequences. 415 The commission’s ultimate goals would be to create
a pandemic scale, and potential response matrix, that is legally rational, medically defensible, and
publicly understandable. A pandemic scale of 1–10 might be a good starting place, as it would
likely allow enough gradations between the common flu, COVID-19, and diseases with greater
lethality such as Ebola/hemorrhagic fevers. This task will be accomplished prior to the next
pandemic.
Public acceptance of this committee’s statements will depend upon the committee’s
credibility and the credibility of the medical data. Therefore, the makeup of the advisory group is
essential to its success and should consist of a diverse range of individuals from medicine, law,
emergency response, military, state and local government, academia, and the private sector.
Science should be the guiding factor. The central reason to create a new commission,
however, is not to duplicate the scientific findings of the CDC and others, but rather to provide a
publicly credible messenger that provides a sense of balanced policy that considers practical and
constitutional principles in delivering difficult crisis recommendations. Accordingly, we suggest
that three members of the commission are selected each by the majority party of the Senate, the
minority party of the Senate, the majority party of the House of Representatives, and the minority
party of the House of Representatives–totaling twelve members. The president would then appoint
two members and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court would appoint two members. All
members serve a four-year term.
This commission would likely be housed in the Executive Branch, which would help it to
respond more quickly to emerging threats and would issue public reports to the legislative and
judiciary branches. This commission could be created by executive order or, possibly, legislation.
Realistically, existing institutions with authority during a pandemic may resist this type of change.
However, a credible commission can augment and help other institutions make difficult and
controversial decisions.
To enhance credibility, members of the commission should be drawn from the following
categories: (1) privacy, constitutional, or health law experts; (2) mental health experts in longterm disasters from the fields of psychiatry, sociology, or psychology; (3) experts from
epidemiology, critical care or infectious disease physicians; (4) emergency response or infectious
disease experts from the CDC, NIH, or FEMA; (5) experts in biological warfare or logistics
division from the military or intelligence community; and (6) state and local officials.
Ideally, the commission should be created when there is not an existing pandemic. The
commission could set standards for evaluation and evaluate responses in a non-crisis atmosphere.
The review of current crisis policies in light of COVID-19 will reveal structural weaknesses in the
415
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response process. It is better to create emergency policy when the country is not living an
emergency. The flaws and mistakes should be openly addressed to allow for a response to the
next pandemic to have a roadmap for timely and effective emergency actions.
After implementing the first task, such an organization would respond in an as-needed
capacity when public health crises arise and evolve. Once a significant disease appears, the
commission would be tasked with: (1) assessing the severity and transmissibility of the threat and
classifying it in accordance with the predetermined set of standards; (2) informing the HHS
Secretary a public health emergency exists; and (3) if so, providing the extent of the threat through
use of its classification framework. The commission’s determinations would be advisory in nature
and directed toward comprehensive policy recommendations for the national, state, and local
governments as well as the private sector. Careful review and finding by the Commission would
provide support for actions including findings that can provide evidence of compelling government
interests when intrusive actions are unavoidable. Evidence of compelling interest is, of course, a
standard for reviewing various governmental actions and has been a standard for judicial review
of action in previous pandemics.
Such a function is reminiscent of that served by the National Council of Justice of Brazil,
which issues non-binding recommendations to the Brazilian judiciary system. 416 Over the last ten
years, this Council has proposed over one-hundred recommendations addressing health litigation;
though its determinations are not binding, they are useful in increasing confidence and efficiency
in judicial decision making.
The U.S. Congress and the executive branch could then utilize the commission’s
categorization system, and their recommendations for legal and publicly understandable options,
to establish plans and policies for the next pandemic. These policies would recommend the extent
of governmental authority that should be used by each branch and level of government, dependent
on the category of threat that is present at a particular point in time. Whenever a new pathogen
arises, the panel would categorize it and submit its recommendation to the Secretary. The president
would decide whether to declare a nationwide Public Health Emergency. Once a Public Health
Emergency is declared, government actors could look to existing statutes for recommendations of
the measures they are able to enact.
Of course, an advisory authority cannot be expected to answer all questions. In an
emergency, leaders at all levels are asked to make difficult decisions with dramatic consequences.
Even with the established threat levels, decisions will be difficult. As we have learned, delays can
be disastrous, and making no decision is a decision.
To be properly prepared for the next pandemic, we must have the best architecture for a
response, and a system that provides the best information possible to all decision makers. The
aforementioned classification framework could provide this structure. The advisory authority is a
critical component of this architecture to ensure this classification framework is scientifically
rational and publicly acceptable. Those tools were either not available or did not operate smoothly
for most of the COVID-19 crisis.
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B. DEFINE AND LIMIT “EMERGENCY AUTHORITY” TO SPECIFY PANDEMIC
EMERGENCIES BASED ON THREAT LEVEL
The general definition of “emergency” is too vague. It is possible to categorize
emergencies in a way that will help define government actions. Certain emergencies are
geographically definable. Hurricane Katrina was a disaster that required focused attention in one
part of the United States. The September 11 terrorist attack emergency had a focused impact but,
in many ways, required a nationwide response. Emergencies can also be defined by their duration.
Natural disasters often occur in a short duration of time but have lasting effects; a pandemic, in
contrast, can span months or even years. Emergency authority for pandemics should be defined
based on the category of the pandemic as described in Section V(a) above.
Defining emergencies must recognize that emergencies take different forms. Earthquakes,
hurricanes, and pandemics are very different types of emergencies, and each one of these
extraordinary occurrences affects people in different ways. For example, while earthquakes and
hurricanes end in hours, pandemics may last months or years. While earthquakes and hurricanes
depend on quick evacuations, pandemics may require people to stay at home as much as possible.
Emergencies are different and the federal law should treat them differently. The public is
acquainted with the concept of a Category 5 hurricane and a 4.5 Earthquake. 417 Based on the
process described in Section V(a) above, we can promote a public understanding of a level 9
pandemic with an understanding of what responses should be made.
An important component of limiting emergency authority is the duration of emergency
powers. Time limits are currently part of many emergency measures, and, in the case of COVID19, emergency powers have been repeatedly renewed to bypass those time limits. The time limits
are appropriate for limiting the expansion of power to impose extraordinary measures.
Congress and both state and local governments should define and establish government
responses dependent on the category of a pandemic threat. Such statutes could contemplate powers
exercised during COVID-19 and evaluate what threat level justifies various actions. Logically, a
defined high-level threat like Ebola could justify significant measures based on the emergency and
threat level. Following are examples of some of the policies implemented during COVID-19:
•

•

Travel Restrictions: During the coronavirus pandemic, the federal government
issued bans on international travel, which were easily upheld. States were more
equipped to limit travel between states as part of their police power. Though
outright bans on entry were not enacted, states were able to implement quarantine
requirements for entry because of health and safety justifications.
Business Closures: Complete business closures nationwide are likely
unconstitutional at the federal level. 418 However, at the state level, these closures
are more viable because of the broad authority granted by police powers. 419
Temporary closures and limits on occupancy require a less compelling state interest
than a lengthy closure would, and lengthy or complete closures could be subject to
takings or due process arguments. 420
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•

•

Masking: Though masking requirements restrain personal liberty, masking is one
of the least invasive pandemic prevention measures available, and countless studies
have demonstrated its effectiveness at limiting the transmission of disease. 421 As
such, state and local governments possess authority to require masking when
diseases reach a high level of classification. The disease would have to have an
even higher transmissibility and severity for the federal government to gain this
authority, but in these instances, some federal mask mandates would also be
possible.
Vaccination: Vaccination is significantly more invasive than masking and
constitutes a more severe intrusion on personal liberty. Because of this fact, it is
questionable whether federal government would ever gain the right to mandate
nationwide vaccination. If the federal government ever assumes this power, it
would have to be under the extremely severe circumstances, such as the Ebola
crisis. Statewide conditional vaccination requirements, initiated by state
governments, are more likely to be upheld. 422 Multiple states already mandate
COVID-19 vaccination to attend public school. 423 However, these existing vaccine
mandates are often accompanied by justification that citizens can opt out of the
vaccine mandate under certain circumstances. 424

Emergency statutes at the state and federal level should establish a definition of public
health emergency based on the declaration of a pandemic under an established process described
above. Based on the characteristics of a pandemic, emergency powers can be more clearly defined
and limited. Only in the most severe health crisis should the most draconian measures be
authorized. It is possible for policy makers to authorize future decisions based on threat level. For
example, if there were to be a category 10 Ebola outbreak, it would be worthwhile to establish
certain travel restrictions, quarantine requirements, business closures, masking, and vaccination
policies during that kind of emergency. The benefit of making these policies in advance is that
they will not be perceived as arbitrary under the general category of an emergency. Further, with
established standards, courts could stop overreaches beyond established policy.
C. DEFINE AUTHORITY AND LIMITS OF LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT TO ACT--MAKE
FEDERALISM WORK
In addition to defining threat level of the pandemic and defining and limiting emergency
powers, future policies should contemplate the advantages and challenges of the federal system.
Both Brazil and the United States are federalist nations. A federalist country divides power
Richard Peltier, There’s No Reason Not to Wear a Mask – and still plenty of reasons to wear one, WASH. POST
(2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/07/28/masks-inside-cdc-delta-variant/.
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between multiple vertical layers of government. 425 During a pandemic, that structure can be an
advantage, but it can also be a source of confusion and disparate treatment.
The COVID-19 virus highlighted the difficulty that federalist countries face when determining
authority to act on a subject that has national collective interest. For instance, Sao Paulo, Brazil’s
most populous state and city, went into lockdown for several months after both the mayor and the
governor announced stay at home orders, but the President of Brazil continuously attacked the
lockdowns and social distance measures that were adopted amid the pandemic. 426
In fact, even when Brazil’s President had COVID-19, and he was seen outside without a mask,
talking to people,427 most states were enforcing strict quarantine measures. The President’s actions
sent a confusing message to Brazilian citizens about how to act during the pandemic and what
policies to follow. 428 The lack of a uniform national policy to fight the virus was identified as one
of the causes for the high number of people infected in Brazil. 429
.

The misalignment in policymaking throughout the country extended to vaccine distribution.
In September 2020, Sao Paulo’s governor signed an agreement with the Chinese pharmaceutical
Sinovac Biotech for a supply of 46 million doses of their vaccine “Coronavac.” 430 The vaccine
was to be manufactured by Instituto Butanta—a Sao Paulo-based research institute. However,
while the governor was working to get vaccines, Brazil’s President had started a “vaccine war”
against Sao Paulo’s Governor, announcing that the federal government would purchase a vaccine
developed by the pharmaceutical Astrazeneca and Oxford University. 431 Sao Paulo was also the
only state to take steps to obtain a COVID-19 vaccine. 432 The President repeatedly questioned
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Coronavac, publicly saying he had no intentions to purchase it. 433 However, when the Coronavac
vaccine was cleared, the federal government claimed the vaccine for national distribution. 434
The United States faced similar challenges because of the lack of uniformity in federal, state,
and local approaches to COVID-19. On May 4, 2020, Florida restaurants were allowed to offer
outdoor dining at 25% capacity, and retailers could operate at 25% of indoor capacity. 435 The
governor’s reopening order gradually increased until the state's stay-at-home order ended on April
30, 2020. 436 Walt Disney World parks reopened in Orlando on July 11, 2020 and July 15, 2020.437
Meanwhile, California’s governor issued a stay-at-home order on March 19, 2020 that lasted until
January 25, 2021, and Disneyland California remained closed until April 30, 2021. 438
Compare the United States and Brazil to New Zealand, a unitary country. New Zealand has
been praised for its success in controlling COVID-19 because of strict nationwide measures. 439 Is
a unified approach necessarily better? Should federalist countries enact more comprehensive
national policies or accept that states can enact different policies? The United States and Brazil
are far different countries than New Zealand. They are larger and more complex. Logically, there
are certain tasks that are better performed with the resources of a national government such as
vaccine research, national data evaluation, funding to mitigate economic impacts, international
travel policies and overall guidelines for response to particular pandemic. It makes sense for the
federal government to support research on, and facilitate the acquisition of, treatments and
vaccines and to provide federal funds can be granted to the states for implementing elements of
the plan. 440 While a federal government is best equipped to compile data and issue widespread
health recommendations, state and local governments still played a major in implementing a wide
range of COVID-19 policies. As noted, local governments have widely divergent policies. In a
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future pandemic, that policies may be appropriate because local governments may be better
equipped to make determinations based on local situations. 441
D. DEFINE AND LIMIT DATA COLLECTION TO PROTECT INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY
The consequences of data privacy from the worldwide pandemic have been profound. 442
Gathering and using medical data in a medical emergency is entirely necessary. 443 Privacy laws
gave way to the medical emergency. 444 European Union countries suspended their landmark
privacy policies for the emergency. 445 When the emergency is over, it is unlikely privacy
protections will return to normal immediately. 446 Therefore, it makes sense to create a data policy
for pandemics, so they do not have to be made during an emergency. A thoughtful data privacy
plan will avoid unnecessary intrusions and will provide more comfort to citizens who are already
afraid and potentially skeptical of government intrusions. The following policy points are ones
that should be considered when forming the best data privacy plan in preparation for the next
pandemic:
1. Minimize collection. Privacy is best served when only essential data is collected, but in a
pandemic, sensitive health data must be collected. Limits on collection limits intrusion.
During a pandemic, government does not need to collect health care information on every
citizen and monitor every citizen’s movement. The nature of data collected during a
pandemic is intrusive: health data, location data and personal association data. Before the
emergency starts, establish the limits.
2. Define use of data. Data collected for health care purposes should not be used for any
other purpose. 447 In some countries, there are massive amounts of information being
collected and maintained. A government in a surveillance state could abuse the ability to
gather deeply personal healthcare information, increasing the already expansive amount of
data it has on individuals.

A small town in Idaho may have different health needs than New York City based on the infection rates of its
population.
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3. Anonymize Data. Not all data needed during a pandemic should to be individualized.
There were examples in this pandemic where programs assessed community wide
compliance with stay-at-home orders without identifying individuals.448
4. Destroy data when no longer needed. While there may be long term uses for health data
on individuals and demographic groups, the retention of individualized data should be
limited or anonymized. 449 Potential misuses can be avoided if data is not individualized.
5. Be transparent about data collection. Data collection is important in fighting against a
pandemic. Testing and contact tracing are necessary weapons for fighting a pandemic, but
they gather sensitive information. The more transparent government is about data
collection, the higher the level of citizen cooperation. Except where government can
dictate citizens’ conduct, good faith and cooperation are keys to success.
Establishing specific data policies before the next pandemic makes sense. There will be time to
learn from the mistakes of this pandemic, take the best data policies, and provide a blueprint for
the future that will facilitate rapid and rational actions with greater understanding and cooperation
from citizens.
VI.

CONCLUSION

COVID-19 created a global health care emergency. Government responses were uneven and
confusing to citizens worldwide. Before the next pandemic governments at all levels should define
plans for that inevitable emergency. Time is of the essence and establishing processes for decisionmaking will save time and lives. Considering and defining limits of authority is also the best way
to protect individual freedom and privacy rather than making decisions in the heat of a crisis.
Existing policies grant substantial authority to executives during emergencies, including
presidents, governors, and mayors. During past emergencies, individual rights have been
constrained—COVID-19 was no different. The severe consequences of lockdowns, closings and
quarantines are undeniable. So are the social, community, and individual consequences of a
pandemic that kills millions worldwide. Balancing government authority to constrain individuals
and the need to protect the greater good with individual liberties and freedoms is a necessity. The
Constitution and the courts cannot take a sabbatical. They must work together to create balance.
Therefore, the courts are asked to play the uncomfortable role of medical policy arbiter.
The law on emergencies is general and vague. The current definitions of state of emergency
and disasters grant the governments vast authority to intrude upon individual rights. In addition,
the extraordinary powers granted are broadly defined. It is timely to reassess emergency powers
vis a vis personal liberty. COVID-19 has been a warning that emergency powers can generate
rational policies but also can produce highly intrusive government practices.
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During COVID-19, countries have required businesses to close and limited hours of operation,
issued mandates, and required long-term isolation. There has also been a massive collection of
sensitive personal data. These measures drastically affect critical democratic values and
fundamental rights such as property, self-determination, movement, and privacy.
The future holds more crises, more emergencies, more pandemics, and more governmental
intrusions. In some countries, intrusion is just business as usual, but in democratic societies, now
is the time to address balancing individual liberties with responses to public health crisis. The
intrusions on personal liberties have been pervasive and unprecedented during the COVID
pandemic. Arguably, many were necessary. However, the absence of established policy added to
the ambiguity and anguish of the citizens of every country. What are the rules? Who is in charge?
What are the limits?
The overall response to the COVID crisis cannot be considered a success. Some failures were
based on poor leadership, some successes were a result of cultural characteristics, but generally
there was a vacuum of cohesive and comprehensive policy. Now is the time to define a policy that
does three things. First, define the authority to implement emergency powers (state, federal and
local). In the United States there are constitutional limits and rational policy reasons to divide the
duties and authority. Because a pandemic will have different impacts in different places, local
governments and state governments should be empowered as well. Second, define time limits.
The nature of emergencies is that they are urgent and time sensitive. Therefore, there should be
time limits on delegation of power, as there are in many statutes now. The limits may be different
for different policies. Third, the policies must recognize and establish limits that protect personal
freedom and privacy.
The world experienced an unprecedented level of government intrusion because of the scale
of the pandemic, the compelling need for action, and the capacity of technology to facilitate
intrusions. It seemed policy was ever changing and unpredictable. That was true because the
pandemic was ever changing and unpredictable. Consequently, the intrusions such as quarantines,
vaccinations, business shutdowns, masking, and tracing, even when justified by health
considerations, created public uncertainty and anxiety. With perspective on COVID-19, it is
timely to create specific structures, processes, guidelines, and policies before the next pandemic.

